Iowa Workers' Compensation

Moad v. Dakota Truck Underwriters , 831 NW2d 111 (Iowa 2013), involved the question of what law to apply (the law of Iowa or South Dakota) to determine whether a South Dakota WC carrier was entitled to subrogation for payments made to its insured by underinsured and uninsured carriers arising out of a settlement from third-party litigation. Claimant died when the truck he was driving for his employer was struck by another vehicle near Iowa City.   WC benefits were paid under South Dakota law.  Claimant's wife filed a third party action in Iowa District Court.  Claimant's wife and children were South Dakota residents.  The WC carrier notified the parties that it was entitled to subrogation of any proceeds received by plaintiff as a result of the third party action. A settlement agreement was reached with Northland agreeing to pay $300,000, plus $100,000 to cover the workers' compensation carrier's subrogation lien.  Plaintiff agreed to file a motion to strike...

In Coffey v. Mid Seven Transportation Co. , No. 11-1106 (Iowa May 10, 2013), claimant filed a review-reopening petition, which was found to be untimely by the commissioner and district court.  The employee also requested reimbursement of certain post-arbitration medical expenses, which were also denied. Claimant originally had an injury to his left leg in 1994, and was unable to return to work following the injury.  After working part time, claimant was ultimately found eligible for social security disability benefits. Prior to filing his workers' compensation claim, the employee had entered into a settlement with a third party for $275,000, of which he received $134,784.95 after payment of attorney's fees and medical costs.  Claimant alleged in his workers' compensation claim that he had injured not only his leg, but his back.  He also claimed that his post polio syndrome was aggravated by his injury.  He was paid workers' compensation payments totaling $70...

Numerous cases on this blog have discussed situations in which the decision of the agency was affirmed on substantial evidence grounds.  In Estate of Herman v. Overhead Door Co. of Des Moines, No. 12-0892 (Iowa App. May 15, 2013), the court concludes that because there was no substantial evidence to support the agency's decision that claimant's injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment, claimant (or claimant's estate, since claimant died before this decision) was entitled to benefits.  The court concluded that: "because we find the commissioner’s outright rejection of uncontroverted medical opinions is not supported by substantial evidence when the record is viewed as a whole, and we find Herman’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment as a matter of law, we reverse and remand." Claimant worked in an unheated warehouse, and there was really little dispute that claimant worked in subfreezing temperatures in the winter of 2009, ...

In AARP v. Whitacre , No. 12-1519 (Iowa App. May 15, 2013), claimant was a 79 year old part time janitor for AARP.  While on a coffee break one day, claimant began to choke, stood up to get a drink of water, stumbled and fell, causing injuries to his head and face.  The deputy and commissioner found that this injury arose out of his employment and awarded benefits.  On judicial review, the district court reversed. In addressing the question, the court noted that the earlier decision in Lakeside Casino v. Blue , 743 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 2007) had indicated that the arising out of test involved proof that a causal connection existed between the conditions of the employment and the injury. The COA also noted that earlier decisions of the Supreme Court were to the effect that risks that were personal to the employee were not compensable, but further noted that Lakeside Casino  and other cases had indicated that the work risk need be no greater than risks outside the workpl...

Hernandez v. Osceola Foods , No. 12-1658 (Iowa App. April 24, 2013) involved a review-reopening claim following an earlier settlement.  At the time of the settlement, claimant had 30 pound restrictions and was working for Osceola Foods.  She remained there for two years after the settlement, but was fired for falsely filling out an employment application for her husband.  She sought other work, and began to work for another company, Farley's and Sanders Candy.  In her application for Farley's, which was through a temporary agency, she did not reveal that she had restrictions, and indicated she was able to perform all duties, which included lifting up to 50 pounds.  A few months later, when the new employer found out about the restrictions, Ms. Hernandez was fired. Claimant sought review-reopening and was denied at the agency level, with the agency finding that claimant's loss of earnings was due to her dishonest conduct rather than to her work injury.  Th...

Millenkamp v. Millenkamp , No. 11-2068 (Iowa App. April 10, 2013) is a case that has been bouncing back and forth between the agency and the appellate courts since claimant's initial injury in 2001, when claimant suffered a traumatic brain injury while working in his cattle business.  The current dispute concerns a situation where claimant had been treating with a physician who retired from the practice.  That physician recommended that claimant see another physician, Dr. Neiman, who provided treatment to claimant.  Prior to seeing Dr. Neiman, it does not appear as if the employer knew that the authorized treating physician had retired. According to the court, when the employer learned that the authorized treater had retired, it sought to provide care for claimant, first with Dr. Young, who refused to see claimant, and then with Dr. Cullen, who claimant refused to see because he had been hired by the defendants.  Claimant argued that because his treating physician ...

In Kramer v. Terex , No. 12-1370 (Iowa App. March 13, 2013), the court of appeals affirmed a decision of the commissioner denying further benefits on a review-reopening claim.  The original decision had awarded benefits of 40%, and on review-reopening the commissioner concluded that claimant had not met his burden of proof of demonstrating changed economic circumstances.  On appeal, the court cited the district court's "well-reasoned" decision and affirmed without comment.  IRAP 6.1203.