Iowa Workers' Compensation

In Marten Transportation, Ltd. v. Bowes , No. 13-0528 (Iowa App. April 16, 2014), the court of appeals reversed the decision of the district court, which itself had reversed the commissioner's permanent total disability award. Claimant was a truck driver, who injured her back and elbow when she fell from her truck.  Claimant sought industrial disability, but did not rely on the odd lot doctrine in attempting to determine the extent of her injury.  In the arbitration decision, the deputy cited to a case which referenced the odd lot doctrine.  The deputy concluded that claimant was unable to perform a sufficient quantity and quality of work to remain employed in a well-established branch of the labor market.  Defendants appealed, and the commissioner affirmed. On rehearing, defendants claimed that the commissioner had erroneously applied the odd lot doctrine.  The commissioner stated that the  odd lot doctrine had not been considered, either at the arbitration level or on appeal.

In Emco v. Sehic , No. 14-0336 (Iowa App. Oct. 15, 2014), the court affirms a 35% industrial disability finding based on the substantial evidence.  The medical records in the case would have provided support for the conclusion that there was no objective evidence to support work restrictions, but the commissioner found, based on other medical evidence, that there had been a permanent impairment and restrictions were appropriate.  Based on this, the commissioner concluded that a 35% industrial award was appropriate. Three of defendants' doctors (Drs. Iqbal, Adelman and Boarini) concluded that claimant's complaints were minor and subjective in nature (although there was a degenerative condition found in the neck and back).  Dr. Delbridge and Dr. Bansal found that there were back and neck problems and found impairment and restrictions.  Following these opinions, Dr. Neff issued a report indicating that the injury was not related to claimant's work. Claimant worked for a ti

In Hinegardner v. Imon Communications , No. 14-0030 (Iowa App. Oct. 15, 2014), claimant alleged that substantial evidence did not support the commissioner's findings regarding credibility or medical causation.   As in most other such cases, the party arguing against substantial evidence loses on review.  The court affirmed the denial of benefits by the agency. Claimant participated in a recorded statement with the adjuster following his back injury, and noted that he had surgery in 1976 for his back and had not treated with a doctor for years.  As it turned out, claimant had a lengthy history of treatment for lower back pain, which continued through 2008, the date of the injury.  Claimant alleged an injury two weeks after he started for the employer, after attempting to pick up a reel of cable weighing approximately 80 pounds. Doctors who opined indicated that claimant had an exacerbation of his back condition as a result of the work incident, but Dr. Gordon stated that "t

The court in Hill Concrete v. Dixson , No. 13-1778 (Iowa App. Oct. 15, 2014), addressed issues of healing period benefits in a review-reopening proceeding.  Defendants argued that healing period benefits can only be awarded on review reopening when the claimant's condition warrants additional benefits under section 86.14(2) rather than when claimant had reached MMI under section 85.34(1).  The court initially concludes that the timeframe for healing period benefits under 85.34(1) applies in review reopening proceedings, Since the decision of the agency finding that MMI had not occurred until May 4, 2012, the award of healing period benefits from July 16, 2010 to May 4 was appropriate. The case had originally been settled by the parties for 55% industrial disability, and claimant subsequently developed pain in his hip resulting in a hip arthroplasty.  Dr. Mahoney took him off work following the arthroplasty, and ultimately found MMI on May 4, 2012.  The agency awarded healing peri

In Mercy Hospital v. Goodner , No. 13-1748 (Iowa App. Oct. 15, 2014), the Court of Appeals address an issue involved section 86.42 of the Code and the interpretation of the commissioner's order.  The order had provided that defendants were to provide permanent total disability benefits from January 18, 2000, except for any periods of time claimant returned to employment.  The question presented was whether claimant was entitled to benefits during periods where she worked partial weeks.  The court finds that she was entitled to TPD benefits during those weeks. The court begins by noting that under Rethamel v. Havey , 679 N.W.2d 626 (Iowa 2004), the district court is bound to enter a judgment in conformance with the workers' compensation award.   Following an earlier visit to the Court of Appeals, defendants paid no additional benefits.  Claimant filed the 86.42 action following the issuance of the earlier decision, and the district court asked whether the case should be remand

In Gits Mfg. v. Frank , 855 NW2d 195 (Iowa 2014), the Supreme Court once again noted that the determination evidentiary issues, including medical causation and the extent of industrial disability, is within the peculiar province of the commissioner, and absent unusual circumstances, should be determinative on appellate review.  In doing so, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which had concluded that substantial evidence did not support the finding of permanent and total disability. The agency concluded that claimant was permanently and totally disabled under the odd lot rule.  This determination was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which concluded that substantial evidence did not support the agency's finding.  The Supreme Court noted that substantial evidence supports an agency's decision even if the interpretation of the evidence may be open to a fair difference of opinion, citing Arndt v. City of LeClaire , 728 N.W.2d 389, 393 (Iowa 2007). The Cour

In Con-E-C v. Nowatzke , No. 14-0470 (Iowa App. Oct. 1, 2014), the court of appeals affirmed a finding of permanent total disability based on substantial evidence.  The court, in its initial statement of the case notes that review of final agency action is "severely circumscribed", that nearly all disputes are won or lost at the agency level, that judgment calls are within the province of the agency, and that it is the commissioner and not the courts, that weight the evidence and assesses credibility. Claimant suffered a low back injury while working for the employer.  The agency concluded that the injury was causally related to claimant's work and concluded that claimant was an odd lot worker.  The court ultimately affirms the agency based on the district court's thorough and well-reasoned ruling, without additional analysis.  Citing Iowa Ct. R. 21.26.

In Vitzthum v. KLM Acquisition Corp. , No. 13-1441 (Iowa App. Oct. 1, 2014), the court of appeals addressed questions related to the correct rate, the imposition of penalties and costs.  The court affirms the rate questions, finds that there was substantial evidence to support the denial of penalties and affirms the costs findings of the commissioner. At the appeal level, the commissioner found that the higher rate urged by claimant ($305.29) was correct, but refused to impose penalties for the underpayment of rate on the employer.  The district court affirmed this amount, but remanded for further fact-finding on the issue of penalty benefits based on the underpayment of the correct weekly rate after July 1, 2009, the date the new penalty statute (section 86.13(4)) went into effect. The court concludes that the rate was correctly determined, finding that the usual calculation method in section 85.36(6) controlled.  The employer had argued that its payment of wages was so unique tha

In Hallett v. Bethany Life Communities , No. 13-1591 (Iowa App. Aug. 27, 2014) the Iowa Court of Appeals concluded that the review reopening statute required claimant to prove a change in her physical or economic condition in order to establish eligibility for additional benefits on review reopening.  In doing so, the court affirmed the decision of the agency, at both the deputy and appeal levels, which had also required claimant to demonstrate a change. Claimant had argued that the statute, section 86.14 of the Iowa Code, did not contain the word change, and provided that a review-reopening was appropriate if claimant demonstrated that her condition warranted an increase in compensation.  The court rejected this argument, finding that the argument is "foreclosed by a string of controlling authority to the contrary."  The court cited Kohlhaas v. Hog Slat, Inc. , 777 N.W.2d 387, 392 (Iowa 2009) among other cases which had used the word change in a review reopening case.  The

In Linden v. Tyson Foods, Inc. , No. 14-0141 (Iowa App. Oct. 1, 2014), claimant suffered a comminuted fracture to her elbow.  Claimant argued that the injury had also affected her shoulder and should have been treated as an industrial injury.  The agency found that there was only a scheduled member injury and the district court affirmed, finding that the situs of the injury was the anatomical location of the physical damage or derangement. Without a great deal of discussion, the court concludes that the agency correctly interpreted the law with respect to when a scheduled member can be deemed to extend to the body as a whole.  The court further found that substantial evidence supported the agency's finding that claimant's complaints of pain in her shoulder were not due to her work accident.  The court concluded that it was within the agency's prerogative to weigh the evidence on these issues and concluded that substantial evidence supported the conclusion reached by the a

Des Moines Area Regional Transit Authority v. Young , No. 14-0231 (Iowa App. Oct. 1, 2014) is a case involving the payment of an IME in a situation where the IME was obtained prior to defendants obtaining a rating of impairment.  The agency concluded that although the costs of the IME could not be paid for under section 85.39 of the Code, costs were properly taxed against defendants, in the discretion of the agency, under 876 IAC 4.33(6).  On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that an IME could not be paid for as costs. Claimant and the agency relied on the court of appeals decision in John Deere Dubuque Works v. Caven , 804 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Iowa App. 2011).  The Young court noted that the award in Caven  was based on section 86.40 and not on section 85.39, which is a true statement, so far as it goes.  The court concluded that in a situation where no rating had been obtained by defendants, "to allow a claimant the costs of an IME conducted prior to the employer&#