Court of Appeals Decides Alternate Medical Care Claim
Millenkamp v. Millenkamp, No. 11-2068 (Iowa App. April 10, 2013) is a case that has been bouncing back and forth between the agency and the appellate courts since claimant's initial injury in 2001, when claimant suffered a traumatic brain injury while working in his cattle business. The current dispute concerns a situation where claimant had been treating with a physician who retired from the practice. That physician recommended that claimant see another physician, Dr. Neiman, who provided treatment to claimant. Prior to seeing Dr. Neiman, it does not appear as if the employer knew that the authorized treating physician had retired.
According to the court, when the employer learned that the authorized treater had retired, it sought to provide care for claimant, first with Dr. Young, who refused to see claimant, and then with Dr. Cullen, who claimant refused to see because he had been hired by the defendants. Claimant argued that because his treating physician had recommended Dr. Neiman, the agency, under its own precedent, could not interfere with that recommendation and had to follow what the authorized treater had recommended. Claimant sought to have Dr. Neiman named as the treater.
Three alternate medical care hearings were held and in the last one, the agency did not agree, and concluded that once the employer learned of the retirement of the treater, they moved quickly to have claimant seen by another doctor. The agency found that there was no showing that the services offered by the employer to claimant were unreasonable under section 85.27(4) of the Iowa Code, nor was there any showing that care had not been provided with reasonable promptness.
On appeal, the district court affirmed the decision of the agency. On appeal to the court of appeals, claimant argued that the employer did not have the absolute right to change care and in light of the fact that the authorized treater had recommended Dr. Neiman, he should be allowed to continue with Dr. Neiman. The court of appeals found that the record supported the conclusion that the employer had provided (or at least offered) reasonable care, and that this care was offered in a timely fashion.
Claimant argued that the decision of the agency was arbitrary and capricious because it was violative of agency precedent that indicated that the employer could not interfere with the recommendations of an authorized treating physician. The court found that factually the case did not run afoul of agency precedent and indicates that claimant "merely quotes single sentences out of thirty-three different agency decisions and contends the agency’s decision in this case runs afoul to them all." The court found that this was not the case, and that the agency's action had not been an abuse of discretion.
The court also rejected a due process argument raised by the claimant because of the alleged failure to follow agency precedent. Also rejected were arguments that the agency should have looked at an earlier timeframe to determine whether the action of the employer was reasonable, and that the employer had a duty to monitor medical care. On the latter argument, the court concluded that evidence before the agency suggested that once the employer knew of Dr. Neiman's existence, and the retirement of the authorized treater, the employer moved promptly to provide care.
The Millenkamp case is heavily fact intensive and thus most likely does not provide much in the way of precedent with respect to future alternate medical care cases. Reading between the lines of the Court of Appeal's decisions, it appears as though claimant had been very concerned about prior treatment he had been provided and was worried that the past treatment, which claimant believed was unreasonable, would lead to additional unreasonable treatment in the future. The court restricted its inquiry to the immediate question before them and concluded that the employer's actions had been reasonable and care had been offered with reasonable promptness, thus affirming the agency.
According to the court, when the employer learned that the authorized treater had retired, it sought to provide care for claimant, first with Dr. Young, who refused to see claimant, and then with Dr. Cullen, who claimant refused to see because he had been hired by the defendants. Claimant argued that because his treating physician had recommended Dr. Neiman, the agency, under its own precedent, could not interfere with that recommendation and had to follow what the authorized treater had recommended. Claimant sought to have Dr. Neiman named as the treater.
Three alternate medical care hearings were held and in the last one, the agency did not agree, and concluded that once the employer learned of the retirement of the treater, they moved quickly to have claimant seen by another doctor. The agency found that there was no showing that the services offered by the employer to claimant were unreasonable under section 85.27(4) of the Iowa Code, nor was there any showing that care had not been provided with reasonable promptness.
On appeal, the district court affirmed the decision of the agency. On appeal to the court of appeals, claimant argued that the employer did not have the absolute right to change care and in light of the fact that the authorized treater had recommended Dr. Neiman, he should be allowed to continue with Dr. Neiman. The court of appeals found that the record supported the conclusion that the employer had provided (or at least offered) reasonable care, and that this care was offered in a timely fashion.
Claimant argued that the decision of the agency was arbitrary and capricious because it was violative of agency precedent that indicated that the employer could not interfere with the recommendations of an authorized treating physician. The court found that factually the case did not run afoul of agency precedent and indicates that claimant "merely quotes single sentences out of thirty-three different agency decisions and contends the agency’s decision in this case runs afoul to them all." The court found that this was not the case, and that the agency's action had not been an abuse of discretion.
The court also rejected a due process argument raised by the claimant because of the alleged failure to follow agency precedent. Also rejected were arguments that the agency should have looked at an earlier timeframe to determine whether the action of the employer was reasonable, and that the employer had a duty to monitor medical care. On the latter argument, the court concluded that evidence before the agency suggested that once the employer knew of Dr. Neiman's existence, and the retirement of the authorized treater, the employer moved promptly to provide care.
The Millenkamp case is heavily fact intensive and thus most likely does not provide much in the way of precedent with respect to future alternate medical care cases. Reading between the lines of the Court of Appeal's decisions, it appears as though claimant had been very concerned about prior treatment he had been provided and was worried that the past treatment, which claimant believed was unreasonable, would lead to additional unreasonable treatment in the future. The court restricted its inquiry to the immediate question before them and concluded that the employer's actions had been reasonable and care had been offered with reasonable promptness, thus affirming the agency.
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