Iowa Workers' Compensation

In Ortiz v. Loyd Roling Construction, No. 18-0047 (Iowa App. Nov. 21, 2018), the court of appeals once again finds that strict compliance with section 17A.19(2) of the Code, a portion of the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, is required, despite the liberal construction generally given to claims in the workers' compensation arena.  In Ortiz , the district court dismissed claimant's petition for judicial review because of the failure of claimant to substantially comply with the service requirements of section 17A.19(2) and the court of appeals upholds this dismissal. Following filing of the petition for judicial review in EDMS, respondents' counsel was added as a "party to the litigation" in EDMS.  A copy of the petition for judicial review was emailed to respondent's counsel.  Ortiz' counsel filed an affidavit of service noting that the PJR was emailed to counsel.  A copy of the petition was not placed in the regular mail until October 3, 2017.  The pet

In Bluml v. Dee Jays, Inc. , No. 18-0317 (Iowa Nov. 16, 2018), the Supreme Court reversed and remanded a case where the commissioner had held, as a matter of law, that an idiopathic injury involving a fall to a level floor, could not be considered a compensable injury.  Claimant had a seizure and fell on a ceramic floor while working for Long John Silver's. In the decision, the commissioner had indicated that there was no dispute that the hard floor had worsened the effects of the injury.  Nonetheless, the commissioner adopted what he found was the majority rule that regardless of the surface, an idiopathic fall was not compensable. The Court eschewed discussion of court of appeals decisions on the topic and instead focused on the earlier Supreme Court decision in Koehler Electric v. Wills, 608 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2003).  In that case, a claimant who fell from a ladder as a result of alcohol withdrawal was found to have sustained a compensable injury, relying on the increased risk

In Brinck v. Siouxland Mental Health Center , No. 17-1774 (Iowa App. Sept. 12, 2018), claimant filed a review reopening action alleging that his mental disorder was caused by his earlier work injury.  The commissioner dismissed the action, finding that the mental health problems were not related to the work injury and further concluding that even if they had been related, this had been litigated previously and was barred by res judicata.  The Court of Appeals affirms the decision of the agency. The court begins its opinion by noting that generally speaking, after an employee is awarded benefits for an injury sustained at work, the cause is closed, whether by judicial decision or settlement. Under the review-reopening provisions of the statute, however, the case may be reopened if the claimant demonstrates that the employee's current condition is proximately caused by the original injury. Claimant was a doctor at the mental health facility who fell and hit his head.  A settlemen

In Keeran v. Quaker Oats Co., No. 17-1525 (Iowa App. Sept. 12, 2018), claimant argued that the agency had used an incorrect standard of law in determining whether claimant had suffered knee injuries as a result of her work at Quaker Oats.  The Court of Appeals rejected this argument and an associated argument that the findings of the commissioner were not supported by substantial evidence.  The take nothing opinion of the commissioner was affirmed. The court indicates that to prove an injury arose out of employment, claimant must establish a causal connection between the employment and the injury.  Claimant must also demonstrate that the injury is the proximate cause of the disability.  To do this, a cause must be found to be "substantial."  Citing Ayers v. D & N Fence Co., 731 N.W.2d 11, 17 (Iowa 2007)..  To demonstrate an aggravation, the injury must not have coincidentally happened at work, but must be caused by or related to the working environment.  The court co

In Harper v. Lensing, Ltd., No. 17-1615 (Iowa App. July 18, 2018), the Court of Appeals affirmed the industrial disability findings of the agency in light of claimant's argument that the agency had not demonstrated a "logical pathway" outlining the commissioner's industrial disability determination.   Claimant suffered an automobile accident while at work, as a result of which her duties were modified.  She later had a fall at home, was placed on light duty and ultimately had her restrictions lifted.  Claimant then developed pneumonia and missed substantial amounts of work.  The employer terminated her employment. Claimant was paid 17 weeks of benefits before hearing.  The deputy and commissioner concluded that claimant was not entitled to permanency above the payment of that 17 weeks of benefits.  The commissioner relied on the opinions of Dr. Jones and Dr. Broghammer.  Claimant sought rehearing and the commissioner again found that he relied on the opinions

In Ha v. CMP Tactical Lazer Tag, No. 17-0687 (Iowa App. July 18, 2018), the Court of Appeals was asked to rule on a claimant's attempt to levy on the property of the employer.  The business was known by different names (AKA, Escape Chambers, CMP) and claimant alleged this was the same property where claimant worked when she suffered her work injury.   Claimant was hired by AKA and continued to work for the facility after her injury in April of 2014.  In early 2014, the facility rebranded itself as CMP.  AKA later indicated that Ha was not an employee.  The agency case caption showed CMP as the employer, but had the same number as the claim against AKA.  CMP did not participate in the workers' compensation hearing and default was entered against CMP.  Claimant filed for a motion for entry of judgment against CMP in district court.  The district court entered judgment against CMP and claimant attempted to garnish CMP's bank accounts.  Claimant attempted to levy agains

In Bahic v. Mercy Medical Center , No. 17-1374 (Iowa App. June 20, 2018), the commissioner had concluded that claimant, who had a stipulated work injury to her back, had not suffered a permanent impairment.  The commissioner's decision came in the wake of the deputy's decision, which had concluded that claimant was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the back injury.   Following the back injury, Dr. Boarini had concluded that claimant's injury was "extremely minimal."  Dr. Mendoza had found that the condition of claimant's back was such that she needed a fusion, which he performed.  Dr. Mendoza, however, concluded that the injury was not related to claimant's work. In reversing the deputy, the commissioner held that claimant had reached maximum medical improvement in February of 2014, before Dr. Mendoza had performed surgery.  The commissioner found Dr. Mendoza's opinions to be the most credible.  In reviewing the commissioner's

In a 6-1 decision, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed their earlier ruling in Bell Bros. v. Gwinn , 779 N.W.2d 193 (Iowa 2010) and held that in order to take advantage of the beneficial care rule, claimant must prove that care that was unauthorized is reasonable and beneficial and provides a more favorable medical outcome than the care authorized by the employer.  Brewer-Strong v. HNI Corp., No. 16-1364 (Iowa June 8, 2018).  The court also concluded that a an employer who initially denies liability of a claim, can later find that the claim is work-related and regain control of the claim, including authorization of medical care.  Finally, the court held that if care is provided to claimant outside of the workers' compensation process, healing period benefits may be lost if claimant does not prove that the care obtained provided a more favorable outcome than that offered by the employer. Claimant suffered carpal tunnel problems, which were thought to be work-related by her initial tre

The Court of Appeals, in Ginther v. Second Injury Fund , No. 17-0867 (Iowa App. June 6, 2018), affirmed the decision of the agency that claimant had not demonstrated a qualifying injury for second injury fund purposes.  Claimant's first injury was plantar fasciitis of the right foot.  Dr. Sassman had concluded that no ratable impairment existed for plantar fasciitis, but found that a 3% whole person impairment for pain was appropriate.  The deputy found that claimant did not have a qualifying first injury because Dr. Sassman's opinion that there was a 3% rating for pain was unconvincing.  The deputy also noted that since the rating was to the body as a whole, this was not a qualifying injury for SIF purposes.  The commissioner affirmed. The court found that because Dr. Sassman did not find that claimant had suffered a loss of use of the right foot, but had rather provided a whole person rating based on pain, he did not establish that he had lost the use of his right foot.  Ac

Linares v. Tyson Fresh Meats , No. 17-1409 (Iowa App. June 6, 2018) involved a situation where claimant was originally awarded a 40% industrial disability as a result of his injury.  As a result of the injury, claimant was sent to work on a line which involved less physical work.  The persons who were on this line were later laid off and claimant filed a review reopening petition, claiming that his economic circumstances had changed as a result of the layoff. Both the arbitration and appeal decisions concluded that the permanent work restrictions were known to the parties at the time of the arbitration decision and were considered at that time in determining claimant's industrial loss.  Since the restrictions had not changed, there was no physical change and there was no economic change, according to the commissioner because the layoffs were not related to claimant's condition, but affected all employees equally. The district court affirmed, finding that claimant's cond

In Borkovec v. Dish Network , No. 17-0743 (Iowa App. May 16, 2018), the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the commissioner which had held that a work injury was the cause of claimant's opioid dependency, but concluding that permanency was not ripe because claimant had not reached the end of his healing period.  The records presented at hearing indicated that if claimant had treatment for his addiction, his function might improve. The  hearing deputy had concluded that claimant was permanently and totally disabled and the appeal decision changed that to a running healing period.  Following a petition for judicial review, the district court reversed the commissioner's decision and found that claimant was permanently and totally disabled.  The Court of Appeals reinstates the decision of the commissioner. Claimant was involved in a serious auto accident and was provided  large impairment ratings by the doctors who opined on the issue.  Dr. Kuhnlein concluded that claiman

Claimant alleged that he suffered an injury to his knee while gassing up his truck and argues that the commissioner ignored uncontested expert testimony in concluding that claimant's injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment.  In Swanson v. A.V. Transportation , No. 17-1127 (Iowa App. May 16, 2018), the Court of Appeals affirms the denial of benefits on substantial evidence grounds. Claimant was an over the road truck driver, who was gassing up his truck on ice covered ground when he slipped, did the splits and felt pain in his right knee.  Claimant did not initially report the injury, but later reported it, indicating this had happened on February 14.  He later amended that to February 15, and finally to February 7.  The claim was initially accepted and an MRI showed a meniscal tear.  The knee was repaired.  An IME, by Dr. Milas found that the knee injury resulted from work related activities, and was based on claimant's account of the injury. At hear

Claimant was found to have met her burden of demonstrating that she suffered a work related injury to her shoulder, but the agency concluded that she did not establish permanent total disability.  Merrick v. Crestridge, Inc., No. 17-0745 (Iowa App. March 21, 2018).  On appeal, claimant contends that the agency's decision was not supported by substantial evidence and that the agency misapplied the law to the facts. Claimant suffered a shoulder injury and the doctors initially believed that the injury had caused capsulitis.  She was placed on light duty work following the injury and was provided with injection therapy, which was helpful.  She was released to regular duty work, but did not return to work for the employer. The treating doctor concluded there was no permanent functional impairment and she was provided a 0% rating.  Dr. Kreiter, who performed an IME, found that claimant had a 13% BAW rating as a result of shoulder instability and a possible labral tear.  He believed th

Claimant was awarded a 10% industrial disability and was denied penalty benefits.  On appeal, the court in Allen v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., No. 17-0313 (Iowa App. Feb. 21, 2018)  affirms the decision of the agency.  The court notes that claimant did not plead entitlement to penalty benefits and the commissioner noted that under 876 IAC 4.2, the claimant was required to please entitlement to penalty benefits before such benefits may be awarded.  Claimant contends that the mention of this issue in an answer to interrogatories should be sufficient. The court noted that whether they gave deference to the agency's interpretation of its rules or not, the district court was not in error in affirming the commissioner's interpretation. Thus, even under a less deferential standard of review, the agency's interpretation was not illogical, irrational or wholly unjustifiable.  Section 4.2 specifically provides that entitlement to penalty "shall be pled."  The court finds th

In Orris v. College Community School District , No. 17-0742 (Iowa App. Jan. 10, 2018). the Court of Appeals addressed an issue where claimant alleged that the commissioner erred in rejecting the unrebutted  opinion of claimant's expert.  Claimant had filed a review reopening petition, alleging that her fibromyalgia condition had worsened and that she was entitled to more than the 30% industrial disability she had originally been awarded.  Although the deputy concluded that claimant's condition had worsened, she found that the worsening of the condition was not causally related to her original work injury.  No increase in benefits was awarded.  The district court affirmed this finding.  At hearing, Dr. Bansal had concluded that claimant's fibromyalgia had followed a logical medical progression, related to her original work injury.  Dr. Bagheri, claimant's original treating physician, noted that fibromyalgia is lifelong, but does not get worse and remains stable or gets

In Hyten v. HNI Corporation, No. 16-1454 (Iowa App. Jan. 10, 2018), the Court of Appeals addressed the exclusion of evidence concerning the delay in receipt of workers' compensation benefits, the safety of plaintiff's work assignment and the company's waiver of notice defense.  The court affirms the exclusion of evidence on all accounts. Plaintiff suffered a carpal tunnel injury.  Partially as a result of that injury, claimant had unexcused absences which ultimately led to her dismissal from employment.  Claimant filed suit against the employer, alleging she had been terminated in violation of public policy for seeking workers' compensation benefits.  After trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the employer. Plaintiff alleged on appeal that the court erred in excluding evidence.  The court notes that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading

In Ruiz v. Revstone Casting Industries, LLC , No. 16-1728 (Iowa App. Dec. 6, 2017), the court affirmed the decision of the agency that claimant had not provided sufficient notice of his hearing loss, back and hand  claims and affirmed the district court's order remanding claimant's back injury claim to the commissioner. Claimant worked for the employer as a grinder for 25 years. He began to feel he had a right to "something" from his injuries after he was prescribed hearing aids.  Claimant noted that he had made doctors' appointments on his own for his hands.  Claimant ultimately retired from Revstone in 2011 because of the pain in his foot, hands and back in addition to his hearing loss.  With respect to the carpal tunnel claim, the commissioner failed to specify a date of injury for the claim.  The court indicates that the carpal tunnel claim was a cumulative injury requiring application of the standard under Oscar Meyer Foods Corp. v. Tasler  which indicate

Following a significant accident in which claimant injured his hand, shoulder and neck when a sealing clamp of a machine closed on his hand, Allen Conell sought payment for an active and passive prosthetic device.  The commissioner denied the passive prosthetic hand, but the Court of Appeals, following the decision of the district court, reversed the decision of the agency.  Nestle USA v. Conell , No. 17-0267 (Iowa App. Feb. 7, 2018). Claimant had originally been awarded a passive prosthetic hand following the injury, but the commissioner reversed this award finding that providing the passive prosthetic hand in addition to an active prosthetic hand violated the language of section 85.27(1), which only requires that "one set of permanent prosthetic devices" be provided. The commissioner held that claimant was only entitled to one prosthetic device per entitlement and that having an active and passive device violated this requirement.  The district court reversed, finding

2018 Workers' Compensation Appeal Decisions December 2018 Fix v. Polk County, Iowa , No. 5051755 (App. Dec. 28, 2018) -  At hearing, claimant was found to have established a cumulative injury and was given a 20% industrial award (Elliott). Defendant appeals and on appeal, the commissioner's designee (Palmer) affirms the decision with minimal additional analysis.  Defendant had argued the claimant was not a credible witness, but the appeal noted that determinations of the hearing deputy were to be provided deference. 25 months from arbitration to hearing decision.   Marrs v. Regional Care Hospital Partners, Inc. , No. 5052161 (App. Dec. 21, 2018) - Claimant was found eligible for a running award of healing period benefits at a rate of $559.49 for an injury to the neck and spine.   Penalty benefits in the amount of $50,000 were also awarded (McElderry).  On appeal, the commissioner affirms the award of a running healing period at a rate of $559.49, but reduces the pena