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Showing posts from September, 2019

Court of Appeals Affirms Award of IME in Review Reopening Case

In Ostwinkle v. Mathay Construction Co. , No. 19-0341 (Iowa App. Sept. 25, 2019), the Court of Appeals affirmed the award of a second IME in a review reopening case under section 85.39 of the Code.  After filing his review reopening case, claimant sought and was granted an IME by the commissioner, which was duly paid by defendants.  Claimant subsequently dismissed the review reopening petition, and later refiled following the issuance of a second impairment rating by defendants' physician.  Claimant sought another IME, which was granted by the deputy.  Defendants appealed and  the commissioner and district court affirmed. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the agency was affirmed. Defendants argued that 85.39 permits payment for only a single IME.  Claimant argued that the statute allows a second IME if there is a second impairment rating by defendants' physician, which had occurred in this case.  The court concluded that Kohlhaas was the most applicable

Court of Appeals Affirms Finding of Permanency Based on Heart Condition

The court in A-Tec Recycling v. Wood , No. 18-2182 (Iowa App. Sept. 11, 2019) found that the commissioner's decision concluding that claimant's heart condition was attributable to his employment, was supported by substantial evidence.  A 10% industrial award was affirmed. Claimant had fallen from the back of a truck and experienced significant bruising on his right side.  Following the fall, the condition worsened and when he sought medical treatment, he was diagnosed with atrial fibrillation, pneumonia and pleural effusion.  The Court of Appeals concludes that because claimant's treating physician found that the work injury was a substantial contributing factor to the heart problem, the decision of the agency was supported by substantial evidence.  The doctor's finding that claimant would be required to use medications for the rest of his life as a result of the heart condition was also found to be substantial evidence supporting a finding of permanency.  

Court of Appeals Affirms Denial of Permanency, Penalty Benefits

The Court of Appeals, in Hecht v. Highline Construction, Inc ., No. 18-2017 (Iowa App. Sept. 11, 2019), affirmed the commissioner's denial of permanency benefits as well as the denial of penalty benefits. The original arbitration decision had awarded claimant a 30% industrial award based on hearing loss and tinnitus.  Claimant testified that when working at a job as a driver after working for Hecht, he had a difficult time driving because of the tinnitus and hearing loss and left that job.  Following the hearing, defendants sought to introduce three additional exhibits, which demonstrated that claimant left Hecht because of unacceptable performance and left his subsequent job because he was asked to conduct illegal DOT inspections.  The deputy granted a motion to admit this evidence.  The commissioner affirmed this finding and based on this evidence, found that claimant was not credible and reversed the 30% award.   On appeal, claimant argues that under rule 4.28, a request

Court of Appeals Concludes Petition for Judicial Review Not Served in a Timely Manner

In Bell v. 3E , No. 19-0310 (Iowa App. Sept. 11, 2019), the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the district court and concluded that a petition for judicial review in a workers' compensation case was not served in a timely manner.  The petition was therefore reversed. Petitioner filed a timely petition for judicial review but did not immediately serve the petition as required by IRCP 1.302(5) .  Although the petition was served by EDMS after being filed on May 22, 2018, the petition was not served by petitioner until August 24, two days after the district court noted that no service had occurred.  The district court concluded that the late service did not prejudice 3E. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the district court, and noted that section 17A.19(2) of the Code required service within ten days, by personal service or mail. The court noted that the EDMS rules do not equate to service of process when a petition is automatically served under t