Iowa Workers' Compensation

The court, in Kelly v. Riser, Inc. , No. 11-1898 (Iowa App. Oct. 31, 2012) addressed a question of an employee of a temporary workers' agency, who recovered benefits for an injury from the workers' compensation carrier, could also proceed against the property owner, general contractor and subcontractor.  The court concluded that there was no right of recovery in tort against parties other than the employer, and that workers' compensation was the exclusive remedy available to the claimant.  Claimant worked for Labor Ready, a temporary employment contractor, and was assigned to dismantle and install a new bleacher system for Bettendorf High School.  He was injured on the job.  The contract between claimant and Labor Ready indicated that the exclusive means of recovery for an injury was through workers' compensation.  Following the injury, claimant received workers' compensation benefits, but later sued over parties in tort.  The district court, on summary judgment,

In O'Reilly Auto Parts v. Alexander , No. 11-1864 (Iowa App. Oct. 31, 2012), the court addressed two issues.  The first was whether claimant's injury arose out of and in the course of employment.  The second was whether the commissioner had erred in sua sponte entering an insurance carrier into the proceedings.  The court affirmed on both counts. Claimant contended he had suffered a back injury while unloading a tote from a truck and twisting his body to take a step.  Injury reports did not reflect the date of injury actually claimed in the action.  Claimant was not sent to see the company doctor, and did not initially explain the mechanism of injury to his family doctor.  Dr. Ray concluded that claimant had sustained a worsening of pain from the work accident.  Claimant subsequently had a stroke and explained at hearing that he had problems with memory.  The claim was denied by the deputy but the commissioner reversed and concluded that claimant suffered a work related inju

In Verizon Business Network Serv., Inc. v. McKenzie , No. 11-1845 (Iowa App. Oct. 17, 2012), the court grappled with issues involving review reopening and the commencement date of such benefits, and also concluded that weight loss surgery was not related to the work injury. The case had previously been remanded by the court in November of 2010, to be reconsidered under the review-reopening standard set forth in Kohlhaas .  Claimant had initially been found to have a 25% industrial loss as a result of her back injury, and the commissioner had concluded on the initial review reopening that she was permanently and totally disabled.  The court also indicated that the commissioner should reconsider payment for the bypass surgery under Bell Bros. v. Gwinn .  Finally, the agency was to redetermine the correct date for commencement of benefits. On remand, the commissioner found that claimant was unable to work due to her spine injury.  The commencement date for benefits was said to be the

In Dunlap v. Action Warehouse, No. 11-1451 (Iowa App. Oct. 17, 2012), the court addressed issues of causal connection, permanency, temporary benefits, penalty and sanctions.  The issues concerning causal connection, extent of permanency and temporary benefits were fairly straightforward analyses based on substantial evidence principles.  The penalty and sanction issues are potentially more important. Dunlap was injured at work, and after a numerous struggles to obtain care, including an alternate medical care proceeding, he was set up with Dr. Prevo.  Dr. Prevo found that there was no permanency and further indicated the back problems were not related to his work.  Dr. Prevo was subpoenaed to a deposition and also provided with a subpoena duces tecum.  At the deposition, he refused to provide certain documents that had been subpoenaed.  Prevo refused to answer questions concerning disciplinary proceedings before the Iowa Board of Medicine.  At hearing, Dunlap sought sanctions agai

In Annett Holdings v. Pepple , No. 12-0468 (Iowa App. Oct. 17, 2012), claimant had sought and obtained a judgment under section 86.42 of the Code.  At the time that claimant sought judgment, defendant sought a stay of that judgment, which was denied by the district court.  The court found that although defendant might suffer harm from the judgment, the harm was less certain and less significant than the harm to claimant. On appeal, the court found that the district court had considered the factors set forth in section 17A.19(5)(c) of the Code, in addition to the Supreme Court's decision in Grinnell College v. Osborn.  The court found that "when  a party requesting judgment has met all the conditions of Iowa Code section 86.42, the district court is required to enter the judgment in favor of the party requesting judgment."  The court found that this was the case, and affirmed the decision of the district court. 

In Carter v. Alter Trading Corp. , No. 11-1697 (Iowa App. Oct. 17, 2012), the court decided a claim dealing with equitable apportionment and penalty benefits for failure to pay benefits pending equitable apportionment.  The fighting question was whether the apportionment of death benefits among his children and wife was equitable. Claimant was a native of Honduras and had a family in Honduras at the time he died as a result of an industrial accident.  That family consisted of his oldest son, Angel, his wife Carmen, and his daughter, Lidia. Claimant came to the US to work, and provided the family with support.  Claimant had a paramour in the US, Ruth, with whom he fathered a child, Sandra.  Claimant did not live with Ruth and Sandra, but provided them with support as well. When claimant was killed, both families sought payment of death benefits.  The deputy allocated 45% of death benefits to Carmen as surviving spouse, and 22% to Angel during the period of his dependency.  The remai

In Tyson Foods v. Shaw , No. 12-0432 (Iowa App. Oct. 3, 2012), the court addressed issues of the manifestation date of the injury, and the corollary issue relating to the 90 day notice requirement.  The court affirmed the commissioner's findings which indicated that the manifestation date was sufficient to bring claimant within the 90 day notice requirement.  The court also found that substantial evidence supported the conclusion that claimant's manifestation was correct found by the agency. Claimant alleged a cumulative injury to his feet from his work at Tyson.  As a part of his job, he had to lift 50 pound bags of chemicals, and had to push heavy items.  He was required to wear rubber pullover boots on the job.  Claimant testified that his feet slipped in the boots because they were too large.  Claimant also had diabetes.  When problems began to develop with his feet, Tyson replaced his standard boots with leather steel toed boots.  Claimant had a lengthy process of proble

In Estate of Brehm v. Dubuque Community School District , No. 12-0176 (Iowa App. Oct. 3, 2012), the court of appeals addressed the issue of exclusive remedy in the death benefits case.  Claimant had died while performing one of two full time jobs, and under the provisions of the workers' compensation statute, was paid benefits based only on the wages earned on that full time job.  Claimant's estate argued that this remedy wasn't adequate, and that therefore the workers' compensation statute should not have been the exclusive remedy in the case. Because the damages arose from a work related injury, and the employer had paid the damages owed under the workers' compensation act, the court concluded that the remedy was adequate and affirmed the decision of the district court.  The court noted that in situations where there was not an adequate remedy, claims may fall outside of the exclusive remedy provisions, but found that this was not such a case.  The court conclud

In Annett Holdings v. Allen , No. 12-0388 (Iowa App. Oct. 17, 2012), the court of appeals addressed a suitable work issue in the trucking context, as the Supreme Court had earlier done in Neal v. Annett Holdings , 814 N.W.2d 512 (Iowa 2012).   Allen involved the same trucking company, with the same light duty program in Des Moines as had been the case in Neal .  The primary difference in Allen was that claimant lived in Mississippi, and was over 800 miles away from home.  He declined to perform light duty work in Iowa, and the court concluded that the work offered was not suitable.  The court concluded that the distance traveled to the proposed light duty work was unreasonable, given the distance involved, claimant's cervical fusion, the restriction on the amount of time he could sit, and other physical limitations.  The court affirmed the agency, and reversed the district court in awarding healing period benefits. The court also addressed the finding that claimant had a 50% indu