Iowa Workers' Compensation

In Menard, Inc. v. Scheffert,  No. 14-1029 (Iowa App. 2014), the Court of Appeals concluded that claimant's rate, which was computed on the basis of having received bonuses, was properly computed by the agency.  The court concluded that the commissioner's finding that claimant's bonuses were not irregular was not irrational, illogical or wholly unjustifiable. Claimant received a bonus each year that her department was profitable.  From 1996 to 2008, the date of injury in the case, claimant received some amount of bonus, called the TPS bonus.  Additionally, claimant was eligible for an IPS bonus if the store was profitable.  Neither bonus was guaranteed, and could be revised downward based on fines assessed against employees.  Claimant received both a TPS and IPS bonus in the year of the injury, and the agency included these bonuses in determining claimant's rate.  The district court concluded that the agency's findings on this point were not irrational, illogical

In Reefer v. Gold-Eagle Cooperative , No. 14-0191 (Iowa App. Dec. 24, 2014), the Court of Appeals affirmed a decision of the commissioner finding that claimant had not demonstrated permanency, nor entitlement to medical care.  The court concluded that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the agency's findings. Claimant had a back spasm at work, which caused him to fall to the ground.  Dr. Jew, and later Dr. Igram, found that he had back spasms.  Ultimately, Dr. Igram released claimant to work with no restrictions and assigned no permanent impairment.  Claimant sought treatment on his own at the Low Back and Neck Care Institute in Minnesota.  He was diagnosed with spondylosis.  An IME from Dr. Kuhnlein concluded that claimant had a 10% impairment.  Following the finding of MMI by Dr. Igram, claimant's employment was terminated. At hearing, the existence of a work related injury was stipulated.  The deputy, however, found the injury was temporary and awarde

In Denison Municipal Utilities v. Iowa Workers' Compensation Commissioner , 857 NW2d 230 (Iowa 2014), the Iowa Supreme Court upheld a $1000 fine against the employer and EMC Insurance Companies for failing to file a first report of injury.  The employer had argued successfully before the district court that it was not required to file a first report in a case where claimant had not missed any work and had made no claims of permanency.  The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court.  The court also concluded that the employer had not made a sufficient showing of good cause to avoid the $1000 assessment. The action was precipitated when claimant filed an application for alternate medical care and the agency noted that no first report was on file.  The employer was given 30 days to file a first report, but did not do so.  Before the agency the employer argued that section 86.12 only allows a penalty when the first report is required by section 86.11.  The employer al

In Menard, Inc. v. Bahic, No. 14-0239 (Iowa App. Nov. 26, 2014), the commissioner found a 60% industrial disability and concluded that the commencement date for permanency was October of 2012.  Defendants urged the court to reverse, arguing that permanency should commence in May of 2011 and that the industrial disability award was inappropriate.  The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the agency. Claimant suffered a stipulated injury to his back in August of 2010.  Dr. Igram, although finding that surgery was not appropriate, imposed 20 pound restrictions on claimant, which precluded his former, heavy, work.  Claimant was placed on a job in the sales department answering phones and helping customers.  He worked on this job from February of 2011 until his termination in July of 2011. He received temporary partial disability benefits during this time, because he was often not provided with his former hours of work. The employer sought to place claimant in a sales representativ

Catholic Health Initiatives v. Hunter , No. 14-0202 (Iowa App. Nov. 26, 2014) involved questions of causation, healing period benefits, permanency benefits and medical care.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the commissioner's award of benefits. Claimant had systemic lupus and was receiving social security disability benefits, but returned to work after those benefits were terminated.  She suffered a traumatic injury to her left wrist, hip and knee, and also complained of headaches as a part of this injury.  Following this incident, claimant had a fall at home and visited the doctor following that fall.  Claimant's symptoms had largely resolved when she slipped and fell again at work on March 3, 2010 (the earlier injuries were in 2009).  She was placed on work restrictions following this fall. Claimant was offered light duty work during the day, but could not perform that work because of family obligations.  No light duty work was available at night.  Claimant was placed on FM

Following the settlement of a claim for 12% industrial disability and healing period benefits, claimant filed for review-reopening.  The agency concluded that claimant had established a material change in conditions since the time of the settlement, found that additional permanent impairment had been established and concluded that past and future medical expenses should be paid by defendants.  The district court affirmed the finding that there had been a change in circumstances and that claimant was entitled to medical care, but remanded the case for a finding of whether additional industrial disability had been incurred.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirms the findings of the district court.   Anderson News v. Reins , No. 14-0038 (Iowa App. Nov. 13, 2014). Following the settlement, claimant continued to treat with Dr. Kirkland, and he indicated that claimant did not have any further impairment or restrictions.  Because of the closure of claimant's employer, she was working

In a case involving only procedural issues, the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the district court that it did not have jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal of a case that presented the issue of whether workers' compensation or the Municipal Fire and Police Retirement System of Iowa (MFPRSI) governed the issue of compensation for claimant.   City of Davenport v. Timm , No. 13-1357 (Iowa App. Nov. 13, 2014).  Claimant was a police officer who was injured while enrolled in the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy.  She returned to work, but because she was limited to simple office tasks, she was asked to resign, and told that if she did not resign she would be terminated. Following her resignation, claimant applied for a disability pension with MFPRSI and learned that her resignation disqualified her from benefits under that system.  She then filed for benefits under Chapter 85.  The city moved to dismiss the workers' compensation proceeding for lack of subject matter

In West Des Moines Community School District v. Fry , No. 13-1391 (Oct. 19, 2014), the court of appeals affirmed the commissioner's order finding that claimant had suffered an injury that had both traumatic and cumulative aspects.  Claimant had suffered two traumatic injuries at work, one in 2007 causing injury to his left hip, collarbone and left shoulder and the second incident in 2008 causing injury to the left hip and SI joint.  Claimant initially filed claims relating to both injuries, but subsequently dismissed the 2007 claim.  With respect to the 2008 claim, claimant alleged that the injury was both acute and cumulative. The arbitration decision rejected the findings of Dr. Stoken because she had lumped together the two injuries from 2007 and 2008.  On appeal, the commissioner reversed, relying on the opinions of claimant's family physician, Dr. Honsey, as well as Dr. Stoken's IME.  The commissioner noted that Dr. Honsey had concluded that claimant's pain in he

The Court of Appeals, in a case that is likely to be heard by the Supreme Court, has held that the Commissioner's Declaratory Order indicating that section 85.27 required the release of surveillance materials once surveillance had been conducted was appropriate.   Iowa Insurance Institute et al. v. Core Group of the Iowa Association for Justice , No. 13-1627 (Oct. 29, 2014).  The court, in a 2-1 decision, found that section 85.27 of the Code, in its requirement that the release of all information was required in a workers' compensation case, encompassed the disclosure of surveillance materials. The declaratory order proceeding had been brought by the Core Group of the Iowa Association for Justice (Core Group) before the commissioner to obtain an order elucidating the commissioner's position on this issue.  The Iowa Insurance Institute and other employer and defense counsel groups intervened in the proceedings at the commissioner level.  An initial question in the case was

In Marten Transportation, Ltd. v. Bowes , No. 13-0528 (Iowa App. April 16, 2014), the court of appeals reversed the decision of the district court, which itself had reversed the commissioner's permanent total disability award. Claimant was a truck driver, who injured her back and elbow when she fell from her truck.  Claimant sought industrial disability, but did not rely on the odd lot doctrine in attempting to determine the extent of her injury.  In the arbitration decision, the deputy cited to a case which referenced the odd lot doctrine.  The deputy concluded that claimant was unable to perform a sufficient quantity and quality of work to remain employed in a well-established branch of the labor market.  Defendants appealed, and the commissioner affirmed. On rehearing, defendants claimed that the commissioner had erroneously applied the odd lot doctrine.  The commissioner stated that the  odd lot doctrine had not been considered, either at the arbitration level or on appeal.

In Emco v. Sehic , No. 14-0336 (Iowa App. Oct. 15, 2014), the court affirms a 35% industrial disability finding based on the substantial evidence.  The medical records in the case would have provided support for the conclusion that there was no objective evidence to support work restrictions, but the commissioner found, based on other medical evidence, that there had been a permanent impairment and restrictions were appropriate.  Based on this, the commissioner concluded that a 35% industrial award was appropriate. Three of defendants' doctors (Drs. Iqbal, Adelman and Boarini) concluded that claimant's complaints were minor and subjective in nature (although there was a degenerative condition found in the neck and back).  Dr. Delbridge and Dr. Bansal found that there were back and neck problems and found impairment and restrictions.  Following these opinions, Dr. Neff issued a report indicating that the injury was not related to claimant's work. Claimant worked for a ti

In Hinegardner v. Imon Communications , No. 14-0030 (Iowa App. Oct. 15, 2014), claimant alleged that substantial evidence did not support the commissioner's findings regarding credibility or medical causation.   As in most other such cases, the party arguing against substantial evidence loses on review.  The court affirmed the denial of benefits by the agency. Claimant participated in a recorded statement with the adjuster following his back injury, and noted that he had surgery in 1976 for his back and had not treated with a doctor for years.  As it turned out, claimant had a lengthy history of treatment for lower back pain, which continued through 2008, the date of the injury.  Claimant alleged an injury two weeks after he started for the employer, after attempting to pick up a reel of cable weighing approximately 80 pounds. Doctors who opined indicated that claimant had an exacerbation of his back condition as a result of the work incident, but Dr. Gordon stated that "t

The court in Hill Concrete v. Dixson , No. 13-1778 (Iowa App. Oct. 15, 2014), addressed issues of healing period benefits in a review-reopening proceeding.  Defendants argued that healing period benefits can only be awarded on review reopening when the claimant's condition warrants additional benefits under section 86.14(2) rather than when claimant had reached MMI under section 85.34(1).  The court initially concludes that the timeframe for healing period benefits under 85.34(1) applies in review reopening proceedings, Since the decision of the agency finding that MMI had not occurred until May 4, 2012, the award of healing period benefits from July 16, 2010 to May 4 was appropriate. The case had originally been settled by the parties for 55% industrial disability, and claimant subsequently developed pain in his hip resulting in a hip arthroplasty.  Dr. Mahoney took him off work following the arthroplasty, and ultimately found MMI on May 4, 2012.  The agency awarded healing peri

In Mercy Hospital v. Goodner , No. 13-1748 (Iowa App. Oct. 15, 2014), the Court of Appeals address an issue involved section 86.42 of the Code and the interpretation of the commissioner's order.  The order had provided that defendants were to provide permanent total disability benefits from January 18, 2000, except for any periods of time claimant returned to employment.  The question presented was whether claimant was entitled to benefits during periods where she worked partial weeks.  The court finds that she was entitled to TPD benefits during those weeks. The court begins by noting that under Rethamel v. Havey , 679 N.W.2d 626 (Iowa 2004), the district court is bound to enter a judgment in conformance with the workers' compensation award.   Following an earlier visit to the Court of Appeals, defendants paid no additional benefits.  Claimant filed the 86.42 action following the issuance of the earlier decision, and the district court asked whether the case should be remand

In Gits Mfg. v. Frank , 855 NW2d 195 (Iowa 2014), the Supreme Court once again noted that the determination evidentiary issues, including medical causation and the extent of industrial disability, is within the peculiar province of the commissioner, and absent unusual circumstances, should be determinative on appellate review.  In doing so, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which had concluded that substantial evidence did not support the finding of permanent and total disability. The agency concluded that claimant was permanently and totally disabled under the odd lot rule.  This determination was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which concluded that substantial evidence did not support the agency's finding.  The Supreme Court noted that substantial evidence supports an agency's decision even if the interpretation of the evidence may be open to a fair difference of opinion, citing Arndt v. City of LeClaire , 728 N.W.2d 389, 393 (Iowa 2007). The Cour

In Con-E-C v. Nowatzke , No. 14-0470 (Iowa App. Oct. 1, 2014), the court of appeals affirmed a finding of permanent total disability based on substantial evidence.  The court, in its initial statement of the case notes that review of final agency action is "severely circumscribed", that nearly all disputes are won or lost at the agency level, that judgment calls are within the province of the agency, and that it is the commissioner and not the courts, that weight the evidence and assesses credibility. Claimant suffered a low back injury while working for the employer.  The agency concluded that the injury was causally related to claimant's work and concluded that claimant was an odd lot worker.  The court ultimately affirms the agency based on the district court's thorough and well-reasoned ruling, without additional analysis.  Citing Iowa Ct. R. 21.26.

In Vitzthum v. KLM Acquisition Corp. , No. 13-1441 (Iowa App. Oct. 1, 2014), the court of appeals addressed questions related to the correct rate, the imposition of penalties and costs.  The court affirms the rate questions, finds that there was substantial evidence to support the denial of penalties and affirms the costs findings of the commissioner. At the appeal level, the commissioner found that the higher rate urged by claimant ($305.29) was correct, but refused to impose penalties for the underpayment of rate on the employer.  The district court affirmed this amount, but remanded for further fact-finding on the issue of penalty benefits based on the underpayment of the correct weekly rate after July 1, 2009, the date the new penalty statute (section 86.13(4)) went into effect. The court concludes that the rate was correctly determined, finding that the usual calculation method in section 85.36(6) controlled.  The employer had argued that its payment of wages was so unique tha

In Hallett v. Bethany Life Communities , No. 13-1591 (Iowa App. Aug. 27, 2014) the Iowa Court of Appeals concluded that the review reopening statute required claimant to prove a change in her physical or economic condition in order to establish eligibility for additional benefits on review reopening.  In doing so, the court affirmed the decision of the agency, at both the deputy and appeal levels, which had also required claimant to demonstrate a change. Claimant had argued that the statute, section 86.14 of the Iowa Code, did not contain the word change, and provided that a review-reopening was appropriate if claimant demonstrated that her condition warranted an increase in compensation.  The court rejected this argument, finding that the argument is "foreclosed by a string of controlling authority to the contrary."  The court cited Kohlhaas v. Hog Slat, Inc. , 777 N.W.2d 387, 392 (Iowa 2009) among other cases which had used the word change in a review reopening case.  The

In Linden v. Tyson Foods, Inc. , No. 14-0141 (Iowa App. Oct. 1, 2014), claimant suffered a comminuted fracture to her elbow.  Claimant argued that the injury had also affected her shoulder and should have been treated as an industrial injury.  The agency found that there was only a scheduled member injury and the district court affirmed, finding that the situs of the injury was the anatomical location of the physical damage or derangement. Without a great deal of discussion, the court concludes that the agency correctly interpreted the law with respect to when a scheduled member can be deemed to extend to the body as a whole.  The court further found that substantial evidence supported the agency's finding that claimant's complaints of pain in her shoulder were not due to her work accident.  The court concluded that it was within the agency's prerogative to weigh the evidence on these issues and concluded that substantial evidence supported the conclusion reached by the a

Des Moines Area Regional Transit Authority v. Young , No. 14-0231 (Iowa App. Oct. 1, 2014) is a case involving the payment of an IME in a situation where the IME was obtained prior to defendants obtaining a rating of impairment.  The agency concluded that although the costs of the IME could not be paid for under section 85.39 of the Code, costs were properly taxed against defendants, in the discretion of the agency, under 876 IAC 4.33(6).  On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that an IME could not be paid for as costs. Claimant and the agency relied on the court of appeals decision in John Deere Dubuque Works v. Caven , 804 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Iowa App. 2011).  The Young court noted that the award in Caven  was based on section 86.40 and not on section 85.39, which is a true statement, so far as it goes.  The court concluded that in a situation where no rating had been obtained by defendants, "to allow a claimant the costs of an IME conducted prior to the employer&#

Dillavou v. Plastic Injection Molders, Inc. , No. 13-1359 (Iowa App. Aug. 27, 2014) is an affirmance of the commissioner's decision denying claimant benefits.  The case arose out of a closely held work environment in which claimant was the wife of a co-owner of the business, which was also co-owned by her brother.  The injury occurred when claimant's brother struck his shoulder against hers, causing her to fall to the ground, resulting in injuries to her knee and shoulder.  Claimant and her husband contacted the county attorney about this incident, insisted on bringing charges (of which the brother was acquitted) and bringing a civil action against the brother for an intentional tort. A workers' compensation case was filed, and defendants argued that under section 85.16(3), the actions of the brother were a willful act of a third party directed against the employee for reasons personal to such employee.  As the court notes, this section of the Code is an absolute defense

In Anderson v. Care Initiatives, No. 14-0090 (Iowa App. Aug. 13, 2014), the agency had found that medical evidence supported a finding of causation.  On judicial review, the district court reversed.  The court of appeals reverses the district court, finding that there was substantial evidence to support the agency's finding. While working in a previous job, claimant had suffered an injury to her left shoulder and knee and was given permanent work restrictions in October of 2009 to avoid repetitive lifting, reaching above her head or working above her shoulder level.  She began working for Care Initiatives in July of 2010.  Care Initiatives knew of the restrictions, but found claimant was qualified to perform the job.  Two days before  she began work, claimant went to a nurse practitioner with complaints of back pain.  She was given home exercises and medications, but did not see a doctor prior to being employed by defendant. On February 25, 2011, claimant report sustaining an i

In Ryan Companies v. Bissell, No. 13-1869 (Iowa App. August 13, 2014), the court of appeals affirmed a decision of the commissioner concluding that the employer had actual notice of claimant's injury, that the injury arose out of and the course of claimant's employment and that claimant was permanently and totally disabled. The major fighting issue in the case seemed to be the question of whether claimant had actually notified the employer of his injury.  The agency found that because claimant had told the employer of his injury on the day it occurred (and a foreman had asked if he needed an ambulance), this was sufficient for actual notice.  Claimant did not inform the employer that he was going to seek workers' compensation benefits at that time and initially believed that because he had previous back problems this was not work related.  Despite this, the agency made a factual finding that the employer had actual notice, and this was upheld by the district court and cou

Over the years, the Pella Corporation (formerly Rolscreen) has paid yearly bonuses to its employees.  Although the bonuses differed in amount each year and there was no absolute certainty that the bonuses would be paid each year, those bonuses have been paid every year, since at least the late 1980s.  In Noel v. Rolscreen , 475 N.W.2d 666, 667 (Iowa App. 1991), the court affirmed the commissioner's conclusion that excluded the bonus from a claimant's gross earnings.  Following that case, Pella repeatedly pointed to Noel as excluding their bonuses from consideration in determining gross weekly wages.  The commissioner would sometimes include the bonus, sometimes not, and oftentimes, the cases would proceed to district court.  This is precisely the situation in Pella Corp. v. Minar , No. 13-1616 (Iowa App. Aug. 13, 2014). The court in Minar  posited the issue as whether the agency's inclusion of the bonuses in gross earnings was "irrational, illogical, or wholly unjust

In Saltern v. HNI Corp. , No. 13-1193 (Iowa App. Aug. 13, 2014), the parties agreed to settle the case on an agreement for settlement basis, with defendants agreeing to pay penalty benefits for the delay in paying benefits.  After the AGFS was filed, claimant filed a bad faith claim and filed a motion for partial summary judgment urging the court to find that there was no reasonable basis to deny and delay benefits.  Defendants filed a cross motion for summary judgment, urging dismissal.  The district court denied claimant's motion and granted defendants' motion. Defendants argued that the facts in the workers' compensation case were such that there was a question of whether claimant slipped on ice in the parking lot, or whether the fall was idiopathic in nature.  Claimant argued that defendants' action of agreeing to payment of penalty demonstrated that there was no reasonable basis for its action in denying and delaying payment of benefits.  Claimant argued that the

On Monday, August 4, 2014, Commissioner Chris Godfrey resigned his position as Iowa's Workers' Compensation Commissioner. Since 2010, the governor had attempted to force Commissioner Godfrey's resignation, first by asking for the resignation, and later by reducing his salary substantially in an effort to force that resignation.  As a result of the attempts to force his resignation, Commissioner Godfrey filed a lawsuit against the Governor and other state officials, claiming extortion, defamation and a violation of the commissioner's civil rights because of his sexual orientation.  The story in the Des Moines Register can be found at  http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2014/08/05/chris-godfrey-taking-federal-job-still-pursuing-lawsuit/13610657/ .  As noted in the Register article, despite taking the job with the Employees Compensation Appeal Board (ECAB), the lawsuit against the governor and others will continue. Despite the fact that the Iowa Workers' Com

In Bolton v. Second Injury Fund of Iowa , No. 13-1620 (Iowa App. July 30, 2014), the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the commissioner finding that claimant had not demonstrated a first injury for Second Injury Fund purposes, and thus was not entitled to benefits against the Fund.  Claimant argued that he had a first injury to his left knee in 1982, and noted that an IME had "extrapolated" a 1% impairment rating to the left leg.  At hearing, claimant admitted that he did not suffer any difficulties with his knee until after he began working for the employer some 18 years after the incident.  The court concluded that "there is, quite simply, nothing in the record to tie Bolton's complaints of knee pain to the 1982 injury until after he filed for workers' compensation benefits in this matter." The court noted that the 1% rating was assigned based on subjective complaints of pain, and noted that there were never any restrictions given as a result of

In Architectural Walls Systems v. Towers , No. 13-1653 (Iowa App. July 16, 2014), the Court of Appeals addressed an issue that arises with some frequency before the commissioner - whether deep vein thrombosis can be an industrial injury for workers' compensation purposes.  In doing so, the court affirmed a finding that claimant had a 60% industrial disability. Claimant fractured his right ankle while working for the employer.  He had surgery, but six weeks after the surgery, he began having swelling in his right leg.  He was diagnosed with deep vein thrombosis and surgery was performed to remove a blood clot and insert a filter to prevent clots from moving to claimant's heart or lungs.  Thereafter, claimant was directed to take anticoagulants twice daily. Later testing revealed no active DVT in claimant's right leg.  Defendants' doctors (Troll and Mooney) provided claimant with a rating to the leg.  Dr. Kuhnlein found that the DVT was related to the ankle injury and p

Kollasch v. Hormel Foods , No. 13-1416 (Iowa App. April 16, 2014), addresses issues raised by section 86.42 of the Iowa Code.  Claimant filed for judgment based upon an agreement for settlement.  At hearing, claimant objected to the introduction of what he believed was extrinsic evidence outside of the agreement of the parties.  The district court summarized the parties views about the meaning of several key terms in the agreement, specifically regarding visits to a pharmacy.  Claimant filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the district court had made findings of fact and strayed from the terms of the settlement agreement.  The court also found that the evidence produced by defendants was meant to clarify and not modify the settlement. Claimant argued before the Court of Appeals that the district court erred in making findings of fact, in construing the term reimburse, in entering a money judgment for expenses already incurred and in not awarding costs.  As an initial matter, the

Claimant was a carpenter who started doing carpentry work for Stark Construction when he had an injury.  When he reached the hospital, claimant indicated he was employed by Don Risdahl Builders and was self-employed.  Claimant later filed a claim against Stark, who affirmatively alleged that he was an independent contractors.  The deputy found claimant was an independent contractor and the commissioner reversed.  At the district court level, the court reversed the agency, finding that claimant was an independent contractor. The Court of Appeals reversed the action of the district court and affirmed the action of the commissioner in Stark Contruction v. Lauterwasser , No. 13-0609 (Iowa App. April 16, 2014).  Initially, the court found that since the law did not vested the agency with power to interpret the term "employee," no deference was due the commissioner in determining how the term was to be defined.   On appeal, claimant contended that the district court erred in conc

The Court of Appeals, in Cargill Meat Solutions v. DeLeon , No. 13-1266 (Iowa App. April 16, 2014), once again concludes that factual findings are left to the commissioner, and affirms an award of permanent total disability benefits.  The court adopted the conclusions of the district court, which had noted that the commissioner credited the views of Dr. Hines in finding permanent total disability. The court addressed defendants' argument that Dr. Hines was not provided with all prior medical treatment records, and that therefore the decision should be reversed under the Court of Appeals' decision in Mike Brooks, Inc. v. House .  The court noted that evidentiary rulings were in the commissioner's discretion and that a scrutinizing analysis was not to be given to decisions of the agency on factual matters.  The court also noted that the Supreme Court had vacated the decision in House , upon which Cargill had relied.  The court found that the commissioner had considered all

In Hendrickson v. Ihle Trucking, Inc. , No. 13-1114 (Iowa App. April 16, 2014), the court of appeals affirmed the commissioner's finding that claimant's injury was limited to his right hand.  The court first noted that its review of final agency action was "severely circumscribed" and stated that nearly all disputes are won or lost at the agency level.  Citing Pease  and House. The Court of Appeals noted that the district court had appropriately discussed and considered the evidence and affirmed the commissioner's decision that the injury was limited to the right hand.  The court noted that it could not improve upon the district court's analysis, which found that the agency's decision was detailed and exhaustive.  Based on the district court's decision, the court affirmed, citing Iowa Ct. R. 21.26.

In Des Moines Asphalt & Paving v. Gomez, No. 13-1160 (Iowa App. March 26, 2014), the Court of Appeals summarily affirms an award of permanent total disability for a client who was assaulted by a co-worker at a job site.  Claimant was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder.  On appeal, the court adopts the district court's reasoning and conclusions, pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 21.26(1)(b), (d) and (e).  Although it would appear as though the attack on claimant might have been defended on the basis that this was the willful act of a third party directed against the employee for reasons personal to the employee under section 85.16(3), this was not discussed in the decision of the court of appeals, nor was the issue raised before the commissioner. An Application for Further Review was filed with the Supreme Court and denied on July 16, 2014.

In Sullivan v. Cummins Filtration-Lake Mills, No. 13-0658 (Iowa App. March 12, 2004), claimant argued that section 85.34(7) of the Iowa Code, the successive disabilities statute, operated to enhance the degree of disability to her hands.  The Court of Appeals, agreeing with the agency, finds that claimant failed to demonstrate that a second injury to claimant's hand was compensable, and therefore section 85.34(7) was not applicable.  The court also found that the commissioner had explained his reasoning sufficiently in the decision and concluded that no award of alternate medical care was applicable as the claimant had failed to prove that her injury was related to her work. Claimant had an initial injury to her right hand in 1999, was paid benefits for her injury and returned to work symptom free.  She later developed symptoms in both hands in 2011, and settled this case for an additional payment for the injury to the right arm.  The two injuries that were before the court were

In Mike Brooks, Inc. v. House , No. 843 NW2d 885 (Iowa 2014), the Supreme Court, which had accepted further review, reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and concluded that the agency decision was supported by substantial evidence, thereby affirming the permanent total disability award of the agency.  The agency had previously found that claimant was permanently and totally disabled, a finding that had been affirmed by the district court. At the Court of Appeals level, a 2-1 majority of the court had concluded that the decision of the agency had not been supported by the evidence.  The court had concluded that the doctors who had found causation did not know of a second injury that claimant had sustained at work after he had been found to have reached maximum medical improvement.  The Court of Appeals found that the treaters had not known of this incident and that the IME doctor's opinion was internally inconsistent because it relied on the opinion of Dr. Hatfield, one of