Supreme Court Holds That Simultaneous Injury to Separate Body Parts is Not to be Considered as an Unscheduled Injury Under 85.34(2)(v)

Bridgestone Americas, Inc. v. Anderson, No. 22-1328 (Iowa March 29, 2024)

In this case of first impression,  claimant suffered simultaneous injuries to his arm and shoulder arising out of his work.  The commissioner concluded that because such simultaneous injuries were not encompassed under the listing of scheduled member injuries in 85.34(2)(a)-(u), it should be considered under the catch-all provisions of 85.34(2)(v), which requires injuries not encompassed under 85.34(2)(a)-(u) to be considered industrially under the Code.  The commissioner concluded that claimant had suffered a 50% industrial disability. This finding was affirmed by the district court.

The employer appealed to the Supreme Court, raising three issues.  First, there was insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that claimant's injuries arose out of employment. Second, the injuries should be compensated as unscheduled injuries.  Third, the 50% award was excessive.  The Court concludes that there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the injuries arose out of employment and did not spend a great deal of time on this argument, finding that the commissioner's decision was supported by substantial evidence.

On the primary question presented, whether two simultaneous scheduled injuries should be considered industrially under 85.34(2)(v), the Court concludes that the commissioner and district had erred in their decisions and finds that the injuries are to be considered as two separate scheduled member injuries.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court gives no deference to the commissioner on issues of statutory construction.

The Court finds that under the plain language of section 85.34, the commissioner erred by concluding that claimant suffered an unscheduled injury.  The Court notes that 85.34(2)(v) applies only to those injuries that are not described in paragraphs (a) through (u) and concludes that since arm injuries are encompassed by 85.34(2)(m) and shoulder injuries are addressed by 85.34(2)(n), paragraph (v) does not apply.  Consequently, according to the Court, the injuries are to be considered as two separate scheduled injuries.

The Court specifically rejects claimant's argument that since the statute refers to "a" shoulder and "an" arm, the schedule does not apply since more than a singular injury had occurred.  The Court finds that "we usually don't put too much weight on the use of "a" or "an" or to other uses of the singular or plural."  The Court finds that the singular/plural distinction is not especially relevant as there were not plural shoulder or arm injuries, but singular injuries to two body parts. 85.34(2)(v), according to the Court, does not apply since both of the injuries are described in preceding subsections of 85.34(2).

Claimant had also argued that because 85.34(2)(t) addressed simultaneous injuries to specific body parts ("both arms, both hands, both feet, both legs, both eyes") and simultaneous injuries to different body parts were not addressed, claimant's injury fell under 85.34(2)(v). The Court finds that claimant reads too much into 85.34(2)(t).  Nothing in 85.34(2)(t), according to the Court, precludes workers who suffer other combinations of injuries from being compensated under the appropriate schedule section. Because the injuries are referred to in 85.34(2)(a)-(u), they cannot fall under 85.34(2)(v).

The Court also rejects claimant's argument that a decision finding that simultaneous injuries being compensated under the schedule would render (2)(v) meaningless.  The Court notes that injuries such as back injuries, neck injuries and brain injuries are the type of injuries that are to be compensated under 85.34(2)(v), because they are not mentioned elsewhere in the statute.  The Court remands the case to the agency to determine the appropriate compensation for claimant's two scheduled injuries.