Court of Appeals Concludes that Subsequent Applications for Alternate Medical Care Could be Filed After Dismissal Without Prejudice of Earlier Application

 Hormel Foods Corp. v. Yunior Tamayo-Perez, No. 23-0212 (Iowa App. Dec. 20, 2023)

In this procedurally confusing case, claimant initially filed for alternate medical care, with the claim later being dismissed when defendants agreed to provide care.  Claimant later filed a second application, alleging that defendants were interfering with care.  Following hearing, care in the form of the treatment recommended by the authorized physicians was ordered.  A third application was filed, seeking psychological evaluation with claimant's recommended evaluator.  The application was granted.  The second and third applications involved a spinal cord stimulator, which claimant ultimately decided not to pursue.  A fourth application was filed, asking for pain treatment and consideration of osteopathic manipulative therapy.  Defendants denied liability, based on a "stale" opinion by an orthopaedic spine physician.  The application was dismissed because of the denial of liability.  Claimant filed for rehearing, arguing that judicial estoppel prevented defendants from denying liability. The deputy denied this application, finding that no such filing was allowed by statute.  The deputy suggested that refiling the petition was the appropriate remedy.  Claimant filed another petition less than two hours later. Defendants argued that res judicate/claim preclusion barred this action.  The deputy found that defendants admission of liability estopped them from denying liability on this petition.  Alternate medical care in the form of physical therapy was awarded.  

Defendants filed a petition for judicial review.  They argued that the only avenue to challenge the petition was to have filed a judicial review following the denial of liability.  They also argued that the agency was in error in applying estoppel.  While this proceeding was pending, claimant filed an 86.42 petition in district court and also filed a sixty application for alternate medical care, arguing that defendants had abandoned claimant's medical care.  Defendants argued the it had not denied liability for the claim only for the treatment requested, despite the fact that liability had been denied in the fifth alternate care proceeding.  They also argued that care had not been abandoned.  The district court denied defendants request for stay and granted claimant's request for judgment under 86.42.  the court found that judicial estoppel applied to prevent defendants from denying liability, but found it did not have authority to rule on the newest application for alternate medical care because "it could render the district court's ruling on judicial review ineffective."

The Court of Appeals concluded that the dismissal of the earlier alternate medical care proceeding did not preclude claimant from filing a subsequent application for alternate medical care, as the agency's ruling was not a ruling on the merits, but was rather a denial of liability.  Since the application was dismissed without prejudice, the filing of a subsequent application was appropriate.  The deputy therefore had jurisdiction to consider the subsequent application.  The Court also concluded that defendants were judicially estopped from denying liability, as this position was inconsistent with the position defendants had taken in eaerlier proceedings.  The Court concluded that although an employer may properly admit to injury while still contesting liability for all of the consequences and any disability claimed to result from the injury, Hormel was not entitled to do so in this case because the medical opinions underlying the denial of liability but one had predated the employer's acceptance of liability. By contesting liability, the employer was contesting liability for claimant's back condition, which was inconsistent with its earlier judicially accepted admissions.  Hormal was found to be judicially estopped from denying liability.

The Court also concluded that the denial of a stay by the district court was appropriate, inasmuch as that court ruled on the merits of the dispute in the same proceeding and appropriately granted claimant's judicial review petition. Finally, the Court concluded that the district court erred in concluding the agency erred in hearing claimant's sixth application for alternate medical care. Because no stay was in place, the agency was within its rights in hearing this petition.  The district court was reversed on this issue.