Supreme Court Holds That Married Couple's Separation Does Not Result in Spousal Desertion Under Section 85.42(1)(a)

Blasdell v Linnhaven, Inc., No. 21-1968 (Iowa April 7, 2023)

This case involves the question of whether a married couple who were separated resulted in spousal desertion under section 85.42(1)(a) of the Iowa Code.   Claimant's wife had left the home in search of work elsewhere, and ultimately found work.  The couple never lived together again, but remained in contact, supported each other financially and never sought a divorce.  While working, claimant's wife suffered an injury resulting in permanent total disability.  Claimant's wife subsequently died from an overdose of prescription medication and claimant sought death and burial expenses.  The commissioner denied benefits, finding that claimant had willfully deserted his wife under 85.42(1)(a) without any fault by her.  The District Court reversed, concluding that the decision of the commissioner was not supported by substantial evidence.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court and the Supreme Court agreed to review the case.

The facts presented at hearing demonstrated that claimant and his wife "long held a nontraditional relationship" but had married and lived together for approximately 2 1/2 years before separating for financial reasons.  Claimant had lost his job and his wife could not find work in Delhi, so she left the home and moved in with a family friend in Cedar Rapids.  Claimant subsequently moved from Delhi and began living with another woman, although he filed taxes as "married filing separately" in some tax reports forms, while filing as "single" on W-4 forms.  Claimant also remained in the marital home with his wife's child. In a deposition, claimant indicated his wife was the beneficiary of his life insurance policy and as a driver on his auto insurance at the time of the work injury.  There was differing testimony about how often claimant communicated with his wife, but those communications appeared to occur at least once a month.  Claimant also testified that he gave money to his wife.  Claimant was found to be a generally credible witness by the the deputy.

The Supreme Court notes that it is bound by the commissioner's factual resolution of the question of whether claimant deserted his wife, but indicates that a "question of law is inherent in the commissioner's decision on whether those facts support a conclusion that [claimant] 'had willfully deserted [his spouse] without fault.'" 

The Code at 85.42(1)(a) provides that a surviving spouse should conclusively be presumed to be wholly dependent on the deceased employee unless it is shown that the surviving spouse had willfully deserted the deceased without fault of the deceased.  Here, there was no question the parties were still married at the time of the injury.  The Court found that the "only question here is whether Roger willfully deserted Heather without fault by her."

In an earlier case, James Black Dry Goods Co. v. Iowa Indus. Com'r, 173 N.W. 23 (Iowa 1919), the Court had concluded that a wife does not desert a husband simply because the parties agreed to live apart.  "Separation and desertion are not synonymous."  The Court concludes that with this background in mind, claimant did not intend to desert his wife, especially without fault on his wife's part, under 85.42(1)(a).  The Court noted that the claimant continued to be in contact with his wife and to support her.  The Court also indicated that although claimant had a relationship with another woman, there was no exception in the statute precluding the payment of benefits for adultery.  The Court also noted that the statute presumes that claimant was wholly dependent on his wife in the absence of evidence to the contrary.  Finally, the Court notes that the deputy had found claimant credible, supporting the contention there had been no desertion. Based on the facts, the Court could not say that Roger "intended to desert Heather or that Heather is without fault for there separation." The case was remanded to the agency to determine whether the "willful injury" exception under Iowa Code 85.16 barred recovered.

Justices McDonald and Oxley dissented.  They viewed the determination of whether claimant had deserted his spouse was a question of fact that had been decided by the agency.  Since this was a factual matter and was supported by substantial evidence, the dissenters would hold that the decision of the agency should be affirmed.  The decision of the Court, according to the dissenters, went out of "its way to defeat rather than uphold the agency's decision."