Supreme Court Holds That a "Shoulder" Injury Is Not Limited to the Glenohumeral Joint

 Chavez v. MS Technology, LLC, No. 21-0777 (Iowa April 1, 2022)

Deng v. Farmland Foods, Inc., No. 21-0760 (Iowa April 1, 2022)

In these two cases, the Supreme Court addressed, for the first time, whether the 2017 changes made by the Iowa Legislature creating a a new 85.34(2)(n) and a new scheduled member injury for injuries to the "shoulder" was limited to the glenohumeral joint or extended beyond that joint to other structures affecting the shoulder.  The question raised was whether injuries outside of the glenohumeral joint should be considered to be industrial disabilities or limited to the 400 weeks of benefits under 85.34(2)(n).  The Court, in an opinion announced in the Chavez case, held that shoulder injuries were not limited to those affecting the glenohumeral joint and further found that shoulder cases are to be determined according to the 400 week schedule in 85.34(2)(n).

Claimant Chavez was found to have a full thickness rotator cuff tear and underwent a shoulder arthroscopy with rotator cuff repair, biceps tenotomy, subacromial decompression and distal claviculectomy.  The deputy found that claimant had suffered an unscheduled injury, but limited claimant to a scheduled injury because she continued to work for the employer at the same or greater pay.  The commissioner reversed, finding that the injury was a scheduled injury to the shoulder.  The district court affirmed the decision of the agency.

In addressing the issue, the Court first found that the statutory language was ambiguous, because reasonable persons can and do disagree on the statutory meaning of the word shoulder used in the statute.  Because the terminology was ambiguous, the Court found it necessary to determine the legislature's intent in passing 85.34(2)(n).  Claimant argued that, because "every rotator cuff muscle attached proximally to the glenohumeral joint," the injury should be treated as an unscheduled injury.  The Court noted that, in passing 85.34(2)(n), the legislature did not use the term "shoulder joint," whereas in other sections of the statute, the legislature had referenced a specific joint.  The Court noted that the shoulder could not function to its fullest extent without the muscles that comprise the rotator cuff.  Defining the shoulder in the functional sense, according to the Court, best achieved the purpose of the legislature.  It also aligned with the AMA Guides, which defined impairment to include the shoulder's functions, which encompassed other muscles and tendons outside of the glenohumeral joint.  

The Court also noted that the injury sustained by claimant was referred by everyone, including the doctors who evaluated her, as a shoulder injury.  The Court dismissed claimant's argument that looked to the proximal point of the joint to classify an injury as functional or industrial, finding that that caselaw developed before the legislative changes made in 2017.  The Court concluded that doctors had made determinations for years as to whether an injury was a scheduled member or whole body injury and could continue to make these determinations with respect to shoulder injuries. 

The Court concluded that although more litigation may be necessary to determine the "exact parameters of a scheduled shoulder injury under section 85.34(2)(n)," that did not warrant "ignoring our rules of statutory construction to interpret shoulder to be limited to the shoulder joint."  Thus, it is likely that future cases will decide whether an injury is a shoulder injury or body as a whole injury will be determined on a case by case basis, making the findings of the doctors who evaluate the claimant crucial.

On another issue raised in the case, claimant had argued that she had a scheduled injury to the arm as a result of the same accident.  If the shoulder injury was to be treated as a scheduled injury, those injuries would combine to be an industrial injury under 8534(2)(v), because two injuries such as this were not encompassed within any other sections of the statute.  The Court concluded, as had the agency, that claimant did not prove she had sustained an injury to her arm and found that this decision was supported by substantial evidence.  

The Deng case, which raised the same claims as Chavez, was decided in a brief opinion referencing the decision in Chavez, holding that a shoulder injury is not limited to the glenohumeral joint.