Supreme Court Affirms that Permanent Partial and Permanent Total Disability Benefits Can be Awarded Simultaneously
In a case litigated by Jamie Byrne of Neifert, Byrne & Ozga, the Court in JBS Swift and Co. v. Ochoa, No. 15-0840 (Iowa Dec. 30, 2016) affirmed that under the 2004 amendments to the workers' compensation statute, a claimant could receive a first award of permanent partial disability benefits and then, based on a new injury, receive a permanent total disability award and that these awards can run concurrently. The Court affirmed the action of the Iowa Court of Appeals, which had held that the general assembly removed the barriers to collecting two streams of benefits at the same time, so long as there were two separate injuries and the second injury resulted in permanent total disability benefits.
Claimant suffered an initial hernia, which was found to be the cause of 70% industrial disability. She returned to work following this injury and subsequently developed neck and shoulder difficulties. As a result of these problems, she left work and was subsequently terminated for absenteeism. Both claims were heard in the same proceeding. The deputy found that claimant had a permanent total disability as a result of the second injury. He concluded, however, that the permanent partial award ended when the permanent total award began. Claimant appealed and on appeal the commissioner concluded that although overlapping streams of benefits had not been allowed prior to 2004, pursuant to section 85.36(9)(c), this section had been eliminated by the legislature as a part of the passage of apportionment language in 2004. The commissioner awarded two streams of benefits - 70% permanent partial disability and permanent total disability.
On judicial review, the district court affirmed, based on the theory that a permanent total disability award could not be apportioned under section 85.34(7) of the Code, which only allowed apportionment of injuries arising under section 85.34(2) and not injuries under section 85.34(3) (the permanent total disability section of the code). This was consistent with the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Drake Univ. v. Davis, 769 N.W.2d 176, 185 (Iowa 2009). The Court of Appeals upheld the commissioner's order as well.
The Court initially found that defendant had preserved error on their claim under section 85.34(3)(b), as the issue of whether there could be concurrent awards of benefits had been presented to the agency and the courts.
The Court noted that in Davis, the conclusion was reached that there is generally no apportionment of benefits unless a statute exists permitting such apportionment. Since the changes to section 85.34(7) did not discuss apportionment of permanent total disabilities under 85.34(3), no such apportionment was permissible. The Court saw no reason to revisit their earlier ruling.
The Court continued its analysis because defendant argued that section 85.34(3)(b) was a bar to concurrent partial and total disability awards. Defendant argued that once an employee was permanently totally disabled they could no longer be permanently partially disabled. Section 85.34(3) provides that no compensation for permanent total disability should be paid for an injury for which permanent partial disability is payable under 85.34(2). The language of 85.34(3)(b) goes on to state that if compensation is paid for the same injury, producing a permanent total disability, any amounts are to be deducted from the PTD award. Claimant argued that this section only applies if the "same injury" results first in a permanent partial award which later becomes a permanent total award. The Court, after considerable discussion of the legislative history, finds that claimant's position was persuasive. The Court concluded that there was no reason, based on the legislative history and language of the statutes, to conclude that 85.34(3) was "ever designed to avoid overlapping benefits for separate injuries."
The Court noted that the situation of overlapping disabilities had been addressed by section 85.36(9)(c), but further noted that this section had been eliminated when the legislature added specific apportionment language in 2004 (section 85.34(7)). Since section 85.34(b)(3), on its face, did not prohibit claimant from drawing compensation for permanent partial and permanent total disability concurrently, so long as the benefit awards do not arise from the same injury, claimant was entitled to two streams of benefits.
The Court noted that although the legislature may not have intended the result reached in Ms. Ochoa's case, the job of the court was to follow what the legislature actually drafted and not what it might have wanted to draft. Policy arguments, according to the Court, were best left to the legislature. The decision of the Court seems to invite another legislative visit into the subject of apportionment of permanent total disability benefits.
Claimant suffered an initial hernia, which was found to be the cause of 70% industrial disability. She returned to work following this injury and subsequently developed neck and shoulder difficulties. As a result of these problems, she left work and was subsequently terminated for absenteeism. Both claims were heard in the same proceeding. The deputy found that claimant had a permanent total disability as a result of the second injury. He concluded, however, that the permanent partial award ended when the permanent total award began. Claimant appealed and on appeal the commissioner concluded that although overlapping streams of benefits had not been allowed prior to 2004, pursuant to section 85.36(9)(c), this section had been eliminated by the legislature as a part of the passage of apportionment language in 2004. The commissioner awarded two streams of benefits - 70% permanent partial disability and permanent total disability.
On judicial review, the district court affirmed, based on the theory that a permanent total disability award could not be apportioned under section 85.34(7) of the Code, which only allowed apportionment of injuries arising under section 85.34(2) and not injuries under section 85.34(3) (the permanent total disability section of the code). This was consistent with the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Drake Univ. v. Davis, 769 N.W.2d 176, 185 (Iowa 2009). The Court of Appeals upheld the commissioner's order as well.
The Court initially found that defendant had preserved error on their claim under section 85.34(3)(b), as the issue of whether there could be concurrent awards of benefits had been presented to the agency and the courts.
The Court noted that in Davis, the conclusion was reached that there is generally no apportionment of benefits unless a statute exists permitting such apportionment. Since the changes to section 85.34(7) did not discuss apportionment of permanent total disabilities under 85.34(3), no such apportionment was permissible. The Court saw no reason to revisit their earlier ruling.
The Court continued its analysis because defendant argued that section 85.34(3)(b) was a bar to concurrent partial and total disability awards. Defendant argued that once an employee was permanently totally disabled they could no longer be permanently partially disabled. Section 85.34(3) provides that no compensation for permanent total disability should be paid for an injury for which permanent partial disability is payable under 85.34(2). The language of 85.34(3)(b) goes on to state that if compensation is paid for the same injury, producing a permanent total disability, any amounts are to be deducted from the PTD award. Claimant argued that this section only applies if the "same injury" results first in a permanent partial award which later becomes a permanent total award. The Court, after considerable discussion of the legislative history, finds that claimant's position was persuasive. The Court concluded that there was no reason, based on the legislative history and language of the statutes, to conclude that 85.34(3) was "ever designed to avoid overlapping benefits for separate injuries."
The Court noted that the situation of overlapping disabilities had been addressed by section 85.36(9)(c), but further noted that this section had been eliminated when the legislature added specific apportionment language in 2004 (section 85.34(7)). Since section 85.34(b)(3), on its face, did not prohibit claimant from drawing compensation for permanent partial and permanent total disability concurrently, so long as the benefit awards do not arise from the same injury, claimant was entitled to two streams of benefits.
The Court noted that although the legislature may not have intended the result reached in Ms. Ochoa's case, the job of the court was to follow what the legislature actually drafted and not what it might have wanted to draft. Policy arguments, according to the Court, were best left to the legislature. The decision of the Court seems to invite another legislative visit into the subject of apportionment of permanent total disability benefits.
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