Court of Appeals Concludes that Counseling for Spouse of Injured Worker is not Mandated by Section 85.27

Hoyt v. Wendling Quarries, No. 14-0800 (Iowa App. Feb. 11, 2015), presented the interesting question of whether section 85.27 of the Code required or allowed for payment for counseling for the spouse of the injured worker, when that counseling was recommended by an authorized treater for the claimant.  Ultimately, the Court of Appeals concluded, as had the agency, that section 85.27, did not require payment for such treatment by the employer.

Claimant suffered severe physical injuries while working, and subsequently developed depressive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder and dementia.  He was ultimately found permanently and totally disabled, and that decision was not a part of the case before the Court of Appeals.  During claimant's treatment for his injury, Dr. Michael March, the authorized mental health provider, recommended that claimant and his wife engage in individualized counseling. Claimant's wife was his primary caretaker and Dr. March stated that she would "be better able to provide what he needs if she can manage her own distress and adjustment more effectively."

The employer denied the care, and an alternate medical care proceeding was commenced.  The deputy found that the statute only required care for the injured employee and not other parties.  The deputy noted that although joint counseling had been approved by the agency, individualized counseling had not.  On judicial review, the district court found that section 85.27 only authorized treatment for the injured worker and not any other person.

The Court of Appeals first noted that the agency was to be given no deference because the issue was statutory.  The court also found that if the statute is clear, the court would not look beyond the terms of the statute.  The court concluded that "the plain language of the statute does not require the employer to pay for individualized counseling services for someone other than the injured employee even where such treatment may benefit the injured employee."  The court found that the statute only required an employer provide care to "an injured employee."

The court rejected claimant's contention that the statute should be interpreted liberally to encompass counseling for a claimant's spouse because the counseling could benefit the employee.  The court rejected this argument, finding that it could not ignore the plain language of the statute.  As expressed by the court:  "Fidelity to the text best honors the legislature's expressed policy determination."  The court concluded, in rejecting the argument that the agency had previously approved joint counseling, that the agency's past practice is not binding on the court, that the agency's interpretation of 85.27 was not binding on the court, and that the cases cited by claimant were distinguishable as in those cases the spouse was collateral to treatment for claimant.

Although Hoyt represents a narrow reading of section 85.27, it may also represent a unique circumstance such that the effects of the decision have no ramifications to other claimants and their spouses.  Typically, if counseling is ordered, it will be joint counseling, and the decision in Hoyt does not prohibit counseling of that type, or indicate that section 85.27 would prohibit such counseling.