Court of Appeals, Finding that Second Injury was not Compensable, Declines to Apply Successive Disability Statute
In Sullivan v. Cummins Filtration-Lake Mills, No. 13-0658 (Iowa App. March 12, 2004), claimant argued that section 85.34(7) of the Iowa Code, the successive disabilities statute, operated to enhance the degree of disability to her hands. The Court of Appeals, agreeing with the agency, finds that claimant failed to demonstrate that a second injury to claimant's hand was compensable, and therefore section 85.34(7) was not applicable. The court also found that the commissioner had explained his reasoning sufficiently in the decision and concluded that no award of alternate medical care was applicable as the claimant had failed to prove that her injury was related to her work.
Claimant had an initial injury to her right hand in 1999, was paid benefits for her injury and returned to work symptom free. She later developed symptoms in both hands in 2011, and settled this case for an additional payment for the injury to the right arm. The two injuries that were before the court were a 2007 injury to the hands, resulting in carpal tunnel surgery and a 2008 injury to the wrist, which developed into wrist pain and trigger finger, for which surgery was performed. With respect to the carpal tunnel, the treating doctor found no additional impairment and no restrictions for both hands. The IME doctor, Dr. Kuhnlein, found a 3% impairment to the right hand, but no impairment to the left. Dr. Kuhnlein related claimant's trigger finger to work, but was unable to relate the bilateral hand pain from overuse symptoms to her work. He found no impairment from the trigger finger or hand pain.
The deputy found that neither the 2007 or 2008 injuries resulted in any permanent injuries, and provided no award of benefits to claimant. The deputy also denied claimant's claim for alternate medical care. These findings were affirmed by the commissioner on appeal.
In addressing the issue of whether section 85.34(7) applied, the court noted that when an employee has a preexisting disability from the same employment, under the same subsection of the statute, the employer is responsible to the combined disability resulting from the injuries as compared to the employee's condition pre-injury. That having been said, the court concluded that the threshold inquiry was whether there was a second, "compensable" injury to be combined. The court noted that the statute indicated that the "prior disability must have been compensable under the same paragraph of subsection 2 as the employee's present injury. . ." The court viewed this as requiring that the present injury must be compensable.
The court then affirmed the decision of the agency that the second injuries (in 2007 and 2008) were not compensable, and therefore the statute did not apply. The court noted that the agency was justified in relying on the opinions of several doctors that there was no permanent disability related to the 2007 and 2008 injuries. The court also found, citing Bridgestone/Firestone v. Accordino, 561 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Iowa 1997) that the courts had refrained from imposing unnecessary and burdensome requirements into the statute with respect to the fact finding of the agency. So long as the court could deduce the commissoiner's decision making process, there need be no unnecessarily precise format in issuing decisions. Because the commissioner's process was apparent, there was no error.
The court also concluded that alternate medical care was not available. The court found that a claim must be compensable from a causal standpoint in order for alternate medical care to be a viable remedy. The language of the court's decision on this point is somewhat troubling, as it might be seen to imply that if an injury was not a cause of a permanent disability, no further care was needed. Upon closer examination, however, the court roots its decision in the findings of the commissioner that a causal connection had not been proven. Because the commissioner, relying on medical evidence, found that no causal connection had been made between claimant's work and her overuse syndrome, alternate medical care was not available.
An application for further review was filed with the Supreme Court and denied on August 13, 2014.
Claimant had an initial injury to her right hand in 1999, was paid benefits for her injury and returned to work symptom free. She later developed symptoms in both hands in 2011, and settled this case for an additional payment for the injury to the right arm. The two injuries that were before the court were a 2007 injury to the hands, resulting in carpal tunnel surgery and a 2008 injury to the wrist, which developed into wrist pain and trigger finger, for which surgery was performed. With respect to the carpal tunnel, the treating doctor found no additional impairment and no restrictions for both hands. The IME doctor, Dr. Kuhnlein, found a 3% impairment to the right hand, but no impairment to the left. Dr. Kuhnlein related claimant's trigger finger to work, but was unable to relate the bilateral hand pain from overuse symptoms to her work. He found no impairment from the trigger finger or hand pain.
The deputy found that neither the 2007 or 2008 injuries resulted in any permanent injuries, and provided no award of benefits to claimant. The deputy also denied claimant's claim for alternate medical care. These findings were affirmed by the commissioner on appeal.
In addressing the issue of whether section 85.34(7) applied, the court noted that when an employee has a preexisting disability from the same employment, under the same subsection of the statute, the employer is responsible to the combined disability resulting from the injuries as compared to the employee's condition pre-injury. That having been said, the court concluded that the threshold inquiry was whether there was a second, "compensable" injury to be combined. The court noted that the statute indicated that the "prior disability must have been compensable under the same paragraph of subsection 2 as the employee's present injury. . ." The court viewed this as requiring that the present injury must be compensable.
The court then affirmed the decision of the agency that the second injuries (in 2007 and 2008) were not compensable, and therefore the statute did not apply. The court noted that the agency was justified in relying on the opinions of several doctors that there was no permanent disability related to the 2007 and 2008 injuries. The court also found, citing Bridgestone/Firestone v. Accordino, 561 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Iowa 1997) that the courts had refrained from imposing unnecessary and burdensome requirements into the statute with respect to the fact finding of the agency. So long as the court could deduce the commissoiner's decision making process, there need be no unnecessarily precise format in issuing decisions. Because the commissioner's process was apparent, there was no error.
The court also concluded that alternate medical care was not available. The court found that a claim must be compensable from a causal standpoint in order for alternate medical care to be a viable remedy. The language of the court's decision on this point is somewhat troubling, as it might be seen to imply that if an injury was not a cause of a permanent disability, no further care was needed. Upon closer examination, however, the court roots its decision in the findings of the commissioner that a causal connection had not been proven. Because the commissioner, relying on medical evidence, found that no causal connection had been made between claimant's work and her overuse syndrome, alternate medical care was not available.
An application for further review was filed with the Supreme Court and denied on August 13, 2014.
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