Supreme Court Decides Rate Case Addressing the Question of Part-Time Work
In Swiss Colony v. Deutmeyer, 789 NW2d 129 (Iowa 2010), Kent Deutmeyer worked 30 hours a week at Swiss Colony at the time of his workers' compensation injury. That injury ultimately required an amputation to the knee, and complaints of phantom pain after the amputation. During the time he worked at Swiss Colony, claimant also worked 40-45 hours per week at Webber Metals. The questions presented to the court involved the correct rate for claimant, as well as the extent of industrial disability (claimant left work following his injury, again working in two jobs, but for considerably less money). Also involved was the question of whether the employer could obtain credit for alleged overpayments, which involved section 85.34(5) of the statute.
In determining the standard of review, the court noted that it had previously found that interpretation of Chapter 85 had not been delegated to the Commissioner. Mycogen Seeds v. Sands, 686 N.W.2d 457, 464 (Iowa 2004). The court noted that it had recently modified this standard to define the inquiry as to whether the legislature had "clearly vested an agency with the authority to interpret a particular statue or phrase in a statute." Renda v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 784 N.W.2d 8 (Iowa 2010). The court noted that it must first determine whether the agency had been granted authority to interpret the disputed statute or phrase, and in the absence of such a grant of authority, the court must determine whether the legislature clearly vested the agency "with the power to interpret the statute by implication." The court concluded the section 85.34(5) was not one of the statutes where the agency was clearly vested with power, and the court was therefore free to substitute its interpretation de novo.
In determining the rate issue, the commissioner had concluded that, under section 85.36(9), the claimant had earned less than the usual weekly earnings of a regular full-time adult laborer at his Swiss Colony job, and thus was entitled to benefits based on his wages at both Swiss Colony and Webber Metals. The court reversed, finding that the finding that claimant made less than the usual weekly earnings of a full time adult laborer was not supported by substantial evidence. The court concluded that neither party produced evidence on this issue, as the commissioner had acknowledged in his opinion. Nonetheless, the commissioner had concluded that because the vast majority of businesses view 40 hours as full-time, claimant was entitled to part-time treatment of his wages. In reversing, the court cited King v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 474 N.W.2d 564, 566 (Iowa 1991). In King, the court had indicated that the question was not whether claimants had outside employment, but whether the weekly earnings were inconsistent with the earnings of full-time employees. Applying King, the court found that a 40 hour week could not be considered the standard for every industry. Rather than remanding the case for a factual determination of the appropriate rate, the court stated that "when a record is inadequate, remand for additional evidence is generally not appropriate," and concluded that, given the language of King, there were no good reasons for the remand of the case to the commissioner on the issue of the rate standard for the industry. The case was remanded to consider recalculation of benefits under the proper standard.
The second issue involved in the case was the issue of credits. The employer had overpaid the claimant, and the question presented involved the recoupment of the overpayment by the employer. Claimant argued that under section 85.34(5), if an employee was paid "any weekly benefits" by the employer, the only credit that could be provided was credit "for any future weekly benefits . . . for a subsequent injury to the employee." Claimant's argument was that the employer was not entitled to a credit for future benefits on the same injury, but only on a subsequent injury. The court, citing the express language of the statute, agreed. The employer argued that where claimant had not received his total permanency award, future benefits could be reduced to recoup such an overpayment.
In concluding that claimant's position was correct, the court found that it determined legislative intent based on the words chosen by the legislature, not on what the legislature might have said. The court stated that the plain language of the statute compelled the result that recoupment could occur only in future injuries, citing the language in the statute that covered "any weekly benefits." The court noted that its decision was based on what the legislature said, not what it might have said in the statute. Although the court noted that employers may find themselves without a remedy in such situations, the solution to the problem was legislative.
On the industrial disability question, the court affirmed a 60% award of benefits with little comment.
Although the court struggled with the language of both 85.36(9) and 85.34(5), the court ultimately concluded that because the workers' compensation system is based on a statutory analysis, the words of the statute must prevail. In some cases, this cuts against claimant, as with the rate issue in Deutmeyer. In other cases, the employer's position is harmed. Ultimately, however, since workers' compensation depends on a statutory regime, the words of the statute should be deemed paramount.
In determining the standard of review, the court noted that it had previously found that interpretation of Chapter 85 had not been delegated to the Commissioner. Mycogen Seeds v. Sands, 686 N.W.2d 457, 464 (Iowa 2004). The court noted that it had recently modified this standard to define the inquiry as to whether the legislature had "clearly vested an agency with the authority to interpret a particular statue or phrase in a statute." Renda v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 784 N.W.2d 8 (Iowa 2010). The court noted that it must first determine whether the agency had been granted authority to interpret the disputed statute or phrase, and in the absence of such a grant of authority, the court must determine whether the legislature clearly vested the agency "with the power to interpret the statute by implication." The court concluded the section 85.34(5) was not one of the statutes where the agency was clearly vested with power, and the court was therefore free to substitute its interpretation de novo.
In determining the rate issue, the commissioner had concluded that, under section 85.36(9), the claimant had earned less than the usual weekly earnings of a regular full-time adult laborer at his Swiss Colony job, and thus was entitled to benefits based on his wages at both Swiss Colony and Webber Metals. The court reversed, finding that the finding that claimant made less than the usual weekly earnings of a full time adult laborer was not supported by substantial evidence. The court concluded that neither party produced evidence on this issue, as the commissioner had acknowledged in his opinion. Nonetheless, the commissioner had concluded that because the vast majority of businesses view 40 hours as full-time, claimant was entitled to part-time treatment of his wages. In reversing, the court cited King v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 474 N.W.2d 564, 566 (Iowa 1991). In King, the court had indicated that the question was not whether claimants had outside employment, but whether the weekly earnings were inconsistent with the earnings of full-time employees. Applying King, the court found that a 40 hour week could not be considered the standard for every industry. Rather than remanding the case for a factual determination of the appropriate rate, the court stated that "when a record is inadequate, remand for additional evidence is generally not appropriate," and concluded that, given the language of King, there were no good reasons for the remand of the case to the commissioner on the issue of the rate standard for the industry. The case was remanded to consider recalculation of benefits under the proper standard.
The second issue involved in the case was the issue of credits. The employer had overpaid the claimant, and the question presented involved the recoupment of the overpayment by the employer. Claimant argued that under section 85.34(5), if an employee was paid "any weekly benefits" by the employer, the only credit that could be provided was credit "for any future weekly benefits . . . for a subsequent injury to the employee." Claimant's argument was that the employer was not entitled to a credit for future benefits on the same injury, but only on a subsequent injury. The court, citing the express language of the statute, agreed. The employer argued that where claimant had not received his total permanency award, future benefits could be reduced to recoup such an overpayment.
In concluding that claimant's position was correct, the court found that it determined legislative intent based on the words chosen by the legislature, not on what the legislature might have said. The court stated that the plain language of the statute compelled the result that recoupment could occur only in future injuries, citing the language in the statute that covered "any weekly benefits." The court noted that its decision was based on what the legislature said, not what it might have said in the statute. Although the court noted that employers may find themselves without a remedy in such situations, the solution to the problem was legislative.
On the industrial disability question, the court affirmed a 60% award of benefits with little comment.
Although the court struggled with the language of both 85.36(9) and 85.34(5), the court ultimately concluded that because the workers' compensation system is based on a statutory analysis, the words of the statute must prevail. In some cases, this cuts against claimant, as with the rate issue in Deutmeyer. In other cases, the employer's position is harmed. Ultimately, however, since workers' compensation depends on a statutory regime, the words of the statute should be deemed paramount.
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