Iowa Workers' Compensation

In Bruss v. Grout Scouts, Inc ., No. 19-0943 (Iowa App. April 15, 2020), the court addressed a petition for judicial review that had been filed in a timely fashion but had not been served according to Chapter 17A.  The employee argued that there was an agreement between counsel to accept service of the petition.  Defendants' counsel agreed to accept service, but after several weeks, defendants' counsel indicated she had not received the PJR.  The employee's counsel immediately send the petition but defendants' counsel sought dismissal.  Claimant urged that the employer should be estopped from asserting that the petition had not been properly served.  The Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal, the employee argued that she had substantially complied with chapter 17A, which requires service by mail within 10 days.  The employee also argued that the employer should be estopped since defendants' counsel had agreed to accept service.  Because the petitio...

In True v. Heritage Care and Rehabilitation , No. 18-0818 (Iowa App. April 1, 2020), the court addressed two penalty issues brought by claimant. Claimant initially filed a medical only claim, but moved to amend the action 3 days before the statute of limitations filed to allege eligibility for temporary and permanency benefits as well as penalty. At hearing on the motion to amend, claimant listed permanent partial disability and alternate care, but not penalty benefits.  The deputy concluded the amended petition was timely and directed claimant to refile her petition.  When claimant refiled, penalty was not listed as issue, although the earlier petition had alleged penalty.  The deputy concluded on the merits that the earlier petition was the one to be considered and this was affirmed by the COA in an earlier decision on the case.  Benefits were ultimately paid to claimant in 2015.  After benefits were paid, claimant filed another action alleging penalty be...

In Lovan v. Broadlawns Medical Center , No. 19-0511 (Iowa App. April 1, 2020), the agency denied claimant's application for alternate medical care following a telephonic hearing. On judicial review, the district court found that the decision of the treating physician was so contrary to all previous medical testimony that it rises to the level of the employer choosing improper care for the employee. On appeal, the court notes that although exhibits were present in the record, there was no transcript or recording of the AMC hearing provided to either the district court or court of appeals.  The court concludes that since claimant's own words as to the reason for dissatisfaction with the care provided was essential, the court could not adequately review the record.  The court rejected a claim that it was standard practice not to provide the transcript, finding that other AMC cases before the courts had apparently produced a transcript or record of the hearing.  With no ...

In Huffey v. Second Injury Fund and Mail Contractors of America, No. 18-2055 (Iowa App. April 2, 2020), the court held, among other things, that claimant did not need to produce medical records concerning the first injury in order to establish a loss or loss of use under section 85.64 in SIF cases.  This action affirmed the decision of the district court, which had reversed the action of the agency. Claimant brought an initial action against the employer.  The commissioner found that claimant had established a 2% injury to the right knee in 2011, but denied that claimant had a sequela injury to the left knee as a result of the right knee injury.  Claimant subsequently filed an action for a 2012 for a left knee injury.  The deputy awarded a 50% impairment for the left knee, which was reversed by the commissioner.  Claimant's SIF claim was for a right arm injury in 1999 and right knee injury in 2011.  Despite these allegations, the agency treated the ri...

Over the years, a number of trucking companies have required, as a condition of employment, that drivers' agree that when they are released to light duty work, they will accept treatment in Iowa.  In Roland v Annett Holdings, Inc. , No. 18-1092 (Iowa March 20, 2020), the Supreme Court addressed such a memorandum of understanding in the context of a class action challenge to such proceedings. Claimant was a driver for Annett, where he was injured.  He had signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) agreeing to short-term light duty and treatment in Iowa.  His initial treatment was in Alabama, where he lived.  His doctor prescribed a certain type of therapy with a cooling machine.  The employer sought to have claimant return to Iowa for treatment, but he could not travel by air with the machine and could not keep the electricity on for the machine while driving.  The employer required claimant to return to Iowa.  Claimant filed an alternate medical ca...

In Ditsworth v. Icon Ag , No. 19-0703 (Iowa App. March 18, 2020), the commissioner affirmed an a total award of 50% based on the apportionment of two injuries with the same employer.  The first injury was settled by the parties and the second injury resulted in a total award of 50%, with an additional 30% awarded for the second injury. Claimant appealed the commissioner’s decision, apparently arguing that since different insurers were involved, apportionment should not have occurred and claimant should have received 50% for the second injury.  The court agreed with the commissioner and noted that 85.34(7)(b).  Citing Roberts Dairy v. Billick , the court found the language of 85.34(7)(b) required apportionment. The decision of the commissioner was affirmed.

The case of Thornton v. Interstate Insurance Company , No. 18-0809 (Iowa Feb. 28, 2020) came before the supreme court for a second time.  In the first proceeding, the court had remanded the action for a new assessment of compensatory and punitive damages. 897 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa 2017). In the second trial, damages were set at $382,000 and punitive damages at $6,750,000.  Reductions to both damage amounts were made by the court in this action. The reduction in compensatory damages came about primarily because the court concluded that bad faith had not been shown with respect to the carrier's delayed provision of a wheelchair for claimant.  The court observed that although an order for a wheelchair was provided by the doctor, this was not forwarded to the carrier until after a mobility test was conducted (some ten weeks later) and so bad faith did not apply.  Ultimately, the court reduced compensatory damages to $58,452.42 for attorney's fees and mental pain and suff...