Iowa Workers' Compensation

  US Nursing Corp. v. Decormier , No. 25-0407 (Iowa App. Dec. 3, 2025) Claimant suffered an injury at work.  Under her contract at work, she was initially guaranteed 48 hours of work per week at $65 per hour, with $97.50 overtime.  She received a $10 per hour raise the week before she was injured. The deputy concluded her weekly rate was $1562.50 and denied penalty benefits.  On appeal, the commissioner agreed with the weekly rate but awarded a $5500 penalty.  Defendants filed a judicial review, which affirmed the decision of the commissioner The fighting issue with respect to the rate was whether section 85.36(6) or 85.36(9) was to be applied. The commissioner found that 85.36(6) appied, as claimant had worked at US Nursing for not only ten weeks in Sioux City but on an earlier assignment.  Defendants' argument that 85.36(9) applied because claimant had earned no wages or less than the usual wages customary in the industry was denied, as defendants' own wi...

  Hermanstorfer v. Lennox Industries, Inc. , No. 24-0652 (Iowa App. Dec. 4, 2024) In this case involving only the issue of rate, the commissioner concluded that claimant's time off for a personal health condition was to be included in the claimant's rate.  The deputy had concluded that claimant's frequent taking of FMLA leave established a "pattern" of reduced hours.  Claimant argued that these weeks should have been excluded but the deputy and commissioner rejected this argument.  The district court reversed, finding that the inclusion of weeks in which claimant took FMLA leave was "illogical, irrational and wholly unjustified." The Court of Appeals notes that weekly earnings are defined by 85.36 as those the employee would have worked had he or she "worked the customary hours for a full time period." The Court noted that the statute was to be interpreted liberally in favor of the employee. Under a plain reading of 85.36, according to the Cour...

In Regional Care Hospital Partners, Inc. v. Marrs , No. 19-2138 (Iowa App. Feb. 17, 2021), the court affirmed an agency decision in which claimant was found to have suffered back injuries and the need for surgery as a result of her work activities.  The deputy awarded a $50,000 penalty, which was reduced to $39,000 by the commissioner.  The district court affirmed the commissioner's award on appeal.   The appellate court first found that substantial evidence supported the commissioner's finding that claimant's injury was causally connected to her work activities.  The court noted that the opinions of Drs. Harbach and Kaspar were supportive of the decision of the agency.  The court also found that the commissioner had correctly determined claimant's rate and that the removal of a two week period in which claimant worked fewer hours than customary was supported by substantial evidence. On the penalty issue, the court noted that approximately $80,000 of b...

Following a significant accident in which claimant injured his hand, shoulder and neck when a sealing clamp of a machine closed on his hand, Allen Conell sought payment for an active and passive prosthetic device.  The commissioner denied the passive prosthetic hand, but the Court of Appeals, following the decision of the district court, reversed the decision of the agency.  Nestle USA v. Conell , No. 17-0267 (Iowa App. Feb. 7, 2018). Claimant had originally been awarded a passive prosthetic hand following the injury, but the commissioner reversed this award finding that providing the passive prosthetic hand in addition to an active prosthetic hand violated the language of section 85.27(1), which only requires that "one set of permanent prosthetic devices" be provided. The commissioner held that claimant was only entitled to one prosthetic device per entitlement and that having an active and passive device violated this requirement.  The district court reversed, find...

In Delire v. Key City Transport , No. 16-0720 (Iowa App. Dec. 21, 2016), the court addressed for the second time a rate issue presented by the parties.  Claimant was a trucker, who was only three weeks into his employment at the time of his injury.  He believed that his yearly earnings were to be $75,000 and his original rate was based on an annual salary of $70,000.  This rate was reversed in the original Court of Appeals decision and the case was remanded for further consideration. In the second appeal, the question was whether claimant's rate should be determined based on his salary in two of the three weeks he worked (the third week was significantly less than the other two weeks) or whether all three weeks should be taken into account.  The commissioner considered all three weeks.  The court indicated that section 85.36(7) addressed the situation more precisely because it applied "in the case of an employee who has been in the employ of the employer less ...

In Evenson v. Winnebago Industries, No. 14-2097 (Iowa June 3, 2016), the Supreme Court concluded that an employer's matching contributions to a 401(k) plan are not weekly earnings for rate purposes. The Court also concluded that the district court erred in affirming the date on which the healing period commenced and ended and the date on which PPD benefits commenced. On the rate issue, the court noted that "gross earnings" was defined in section 85.61(9) as recurring payment by the employer before deductions and excluding irregular bonuses, overtime pay, reimbursement of expenses and the employer's contribution for welfare benefits.  The Court notes that although an employee's 401(k) plan is related tangentially to his or her wage or salary, an employer's 401(k) plan matching contributions are based on the employee's choice and contribution.  Although the portion the employee chooses to contribute to the plan comes from his wages, the added contribution ...

Premium Transportation Staffing, Inc. v. Bowers , No. 15-0378 (Iowa App. Oct. 14, 2015), addressed issues of permanent total disability and computation of rate in a case where claimant alleged that per diem payments should be included in the rate.  The court affirmed on substantial evidence grounds, noting that the court's review of agency action was "severely circumscribed." On the permanent total disability question, the court noted that the agency had given greater weight to two physicians, Dr. Sedlacek and Dr. Mathew.  The court noted that there was substantial evidence to support this decision and affirmed. On the more interesting issue of inclusion of per diem in calculating the rate, the claimant had testified that he spent only $12.00 per day for food and the remainder of the $52,00 per diem was kept by claimant.  This was said to be uncontroverted in the record.  The deputy concluded that only $12.00 was a reimbursement for expenses  under section 8...

Key City Transport, Inc. v. Delire , No. 14-1755 (Iowa App. Sept. 10, 2015), involved a truck driver who was injured a few weeks after the start of his employment.  Claimant indicated that he was told when he was hired that some drivers on the route on which claimant worked earned between $70,000 and $75,000 per year.  Claimant worked three weeks, earning mileage and drop fees (mileage amounts were $257, $1254 and $1425 and drop fees were $155, $40 and $240).  Claimant was injured when he was unloading large windows.  Claimant attempted to catch a falling window and fell on his back and felt a sharp pain in his right armpit and shoulder.  Ultimately, surgery was performed for a labral tear. Following the first surgery, claimant continued to have difficulties and a second shoulder surgery was performed, along with right carpal and cubital tunnel releases.  The treating doctor, Dr. Mendel, continued to be concerned about claimant's symptoms and wished to pe...

In Wegner v. Hormel Foods Corp. , No. 14-0300 (Iowa App. Feb. 25, 2015), the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the commissioner on rate and penalty issues.  Claimant had not reached maximum medical improvement at the time of hearing, and the the deputy deferred ruling on permanency, an alleged underpayment of temporary benefits and penalty claims because of this.  The commissioner affirmed the decision of the deputy. Claimant's initial argument was that the commissioner failed to comply with section 17A.16 of the Code, which requires that a proposed or final decision is to include findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated.  The court found that step-by-step reasoning in an agency decision was not essential. so long as "it is possible to determine what evidence was considered and why certain evidence was credited over other evidence."  Citing Schutjer v. Algona Manor Care Ctr., 780 N.W.2d 549 (Iowa 2010).  The court found that the agenc...

In Menard, Inc. v. Scheffert,  No. 14-1029 (Iowa App. 2014), the Court of Appeals concluded that claimant's rate, which was computed on the basis of having received bonuses, was properly computed by the agency.  The court concluded that the commissioner's finding that claimant's bonuses were not irregular was not irrational, illogical or wholly unjustifiable. Claimant received a bonus each year that her department was profitable.  From 1996 to 2008, the date of injury in the case, claimant received some amount of bonus, called the TPS bonus.  Additionally, claimant was eligible for an IPS bonus if the store was profitable.  Neither bonus was guaranteed, and could be revised downward based on fines assessed against employees.  Claimant received both a TPS and IPS bonus in the year of the injury, and the agency included these bonuses in determining claimant's rate.  The district court concluded that the agency's findings on this point were not irration...

In Vitzthum v. KLM Acquisition Corp. , No. 13-1441 (Iowa App. Oct. 1, 2014), the court of appeals addressed questions related to the correct rate, the imposition of penalties and costs.  The court affirms the rate questions, finds that there was substantial evidence to support the denial of penalties and affirms the costs findings of the commissioner. At the appeal level, the commissioner found that the higher rate urged by claimant ($305.29) was correct, but refused to impose penalties for the underpayment of rate on the employer.  The district court affirmed this amount, but remanded for further fact-finding on the issue of penalty benefits based on the underpayment of the correct weekly rate after July 1, 2009, the date the new penalty statute (section 86.13(4)) went into effect. The court concludes that the rate was correctly determined, finding that the usual calculation method in section 85.36(6) controlled.  The employer had argued that its payment of wages was...

Over the years, the Pella Corporation (formerly Rolscreen) has paid yearly bonuses to its employees.  Although the bonuses differed in amount each year and there was no absolute certainty that the bonuses would be paid each year, those bonuses have been paid every year, since at least the late 1980s.  In Noel v. Rolscreen , 475 N.W.2d 666, 667 (Iowa App. 1991), the court affirmed the commissioner's conclusion that excluded the bonus from a claimant's gross earnings.  Following that case, Pella repeatedly pointed to Noel as excluding their bonuses from consideration in determining gross weekly wages.  The commissioner would sometimes include the bonus, sometimes not, and oftentimes, the cases would proceed to district court.  This is precisely the situation in Pella Corp. v. Minar , No. 13-1616 (Iowa App. Aug. 13, 2014). The court in Minar  posited the issue as whether the agency's inclusion of the bonuses in gross earnings was "irrational, illogical, or w...

In Menard v. Jones, No. 12-0027 (Iowa App. Sept. 6, 2012), the court of appeals addressed two issues.  The defendants appealed a question of whether claimant had reached maximum medical improvement, and claimant appealed a question relating to part-time.  On rate, the court in Swiss Colony v. Deutmeyer  had indicated that in part-time cases, there needed to be evidence of what type of work was part-time in the industry in which the claimant was engaged.    The court in Jones indicated that the fact that claimant was hired to work on 4 hours a day (and that the employer admitted he was part-time), was not enough to actually establish that he was only performing part time work under the statute.  Since there was no evidence in the record to establish what full time employment was in claimant's field, the court concluded that the case had to be remanded on this issue. On the maximum medical improvement issue, both the treating physician and IME doctor had re...

The case of Burton v. Hilltop Care Center , 813 NW2d 250 (Iowa 2012), arose out of a unique set of facts, but has led to a decision in which the court has modified its standard of review principles and simultaneously urged the commissioner's office to rethink its manner of deciding cases. The primary issue involved in Burton was a rate question for a claimant who was allegedly supposed to receive a $1,000 per year raise, but was paid (for 15 months) a wage that was $1,000 more on a monthly basis than she had previously been receiving.  The commissioner and court of appeals concluded that the rate should be decided on the basis of the $1,000 additional per month that had been paid, and defendants challenged this conclusion, in addition to challenging a penalty finding and the award of a 30% industrial disability from abdominal injuries sustained by the claimant. In setting forth its standard of review for the case, the court cites the familiar principles of substantial evidence...

In Mercy Medical Center v. Healy , No. 1-338 (Iowa App. June 29, 2011), the court decided a rate issue concerning the use of paid sick and vacation time.  Claimant was hired to work 35 hours a week for Mercy Medical Center in Dubuque, but seldom worked this many hours, due to illnesses and vacations.  Under the terms of her employment, she was paid for the vacation and sick time, and the commissioner found that because she was hired to work 35 hours a week, these were her customary hours.  The rate was accordingly based on a 35 hour weeks at claimant's rate of pay. The district court reversed on the rate issue, finding that since claimant never (or seldom) actually worked 35 hours per week, a rate based on these hours of work was not customary.  The district court found that the hours "actually worked" were the touchstone for the rate calculation rather than the wages received by the employee.  The court found that the language of section 85.36 (specifically...

The appellate courts have had a surfeit of rate cases before them recently, and in Hilltop Care Center v. Burton, 2010 WL 2598373 (No. 0-323 June 30, 2010), the court decided another such case.  The rate dispute was premised on a unique factual situation.  Ms. Burton was supposed to receive a raise, which amounted to $1,000 per year, but was instead paid an additional $1,000 per month, thus raising her income by $12,000 on a yearly basis.  She was allegedly overpaid for the last 15 months she worked for the employer.  Apparently, the error was not discovered until Ms. Burton filed unemployment papers following her discharge by the employer. The deputy concluded that claimant should have been paid on the basis of her actual earnings, not on the basis of what her wages should have been.  The commissioner affirmed.  On judicial review, the district court reversed, finding that "an accounting error is not tantamount to an entitlement to an elevated wage." ...

In Swiss Colony v. Deutmeyer , 789 NW2d 129 (Iowa 2010), Kent Deutmeyer worked 30 hours a week at Swiss Colony at the time of his workers' compensation injury.  That injury ultimately required an amputation to the knee, and complaints of phantom pain after the amputation.  During the time he worked at Swiss Colony, claimant also worked 40-45 hours per week at Webber Metals.  The questions presented to the court involved the correct rate for claimant, as well as the extent of industrial disability (claimant left work following his injury, again working in two jobs, but for considerably less money). Also involved was the question of whether the employer could obtain credit for alleged overpayments, which involved section 85.34(5) of the statute. In determining the standard of review, the court noted that it had previously found that interpretation of Chapter 85 had not been delegated to the Commissioner.   Mycogen Seeds v. Sands , 686 N.W.2d 457, 464 (Iowa 2004)...