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Showing posts with the label liberal construction

Court of Appeals Concludes that Bifurcation Process Under 85.34(2)(v) Only Applies When a Worker Returns to Work for the Employer and is Later Terminated By the Same Employer

  Den Hartog Industries v. Dungan , No. 23-1402 (Iowa App. Jan. 9, 2025) Claimant suffered an injury at work and continued to work for the employer for 11 months with some work restrictions.  He left the job after 11 months to take a different job and move closer to his family.  He subsequently found work, making more than he was making at the time of his job with Den Hartog.  The commissioner concluded that claimant's back injury should be compensated industrially under the provisions of 85.34(2)(v).  The commissioner concluded that the functional impairment provision of the statute did not apply to claimant because he voluntarily separated from the employer and had not been terminated by the employer. The district court affirmed, finding that 85.34(2)(v)'s bifurcated process would be imposed only when the employer returned to work and was then terminated by the employer. On review, the Court concludes that 85.34(2)(v) recognizes two categories for benefit calc...

Supreme Court Holds That IME Costs for an "Examination" are Included in Code Section 85.39

Mid American Construction LLC v. Sandlin , No. 22-0471 (Iowa Feb. 9, 2024) In this action, the sole question presented to the Court was whether the cost of an "examination" conducted as a part of an independent medical examination was reimbursable to claimant or whether the amount to be paid was limited to the the component cost of the impairment rating under section 85.39 of the Code.  The commissioner had included the costs of the examination and the district court agreed.  On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court limited the amount to the cost involved in providing the impairment rating and awarded only $500 of the $2200 amount charged by the IME physician. On further review, the Supreme Court reverses the decision of the Court of Appeals and holds that the cost of the examination was payable by the employer.  The Court begins by noting that section 85.39(1) and (2) both require an employee to submit to examinations as a part of the workers' compensation claims....

Supreme Court Holds that Discovery Rule Applies to Traumatic Injuries

In Baker v. Bridgestone/Firestone, No. 14-2062 (Iowa Dec. 18, 2015), the Court confirmed that the discovery rule applied to traumatic injury cases as well as cumulative injury cases.  The commissioner had ruled, in a series of cases beginning with Clark v. City of Spencer , No. 5017329 (App. Sept. 11, 2007), that the discovery rule did not apply to cases involving traumatic injuries.  On judicial review, the district court reversed the decision of the agency and the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court. The Court first discussed the purpose and character of the Iowa's workers' compensation system, noting that the costs of a work injury should be borne by the industry itself and not dependent on individual fault or negligence.  The "grand bargain" providing immunity to employers from potentially large tort lawsuits in exchange for a claimant not have to demonstrate negligence was discussed at length, as was the assurance of prompt payments in the...

Court of Appeals Concludes that Counseling for Spouse of Injured Worker is not Mandated by Section 85.27

Hoyt v. Wendling Quarries , No. 14-0800 (Iowa App. Feb. 11, 2015), presented the interesting question of whether section 85.27 of the Code required or allowed for payment for counseling for the spouse of the injured worker, when that counseling was recommended by an authorized treater for the claimant.  Ultimately, the Court of Appeals concluded, as had the agency, that section 85.27, did not require payment for such treatment by the employer. Claimant suffered severe physical injuries while working, and subsequently developed depressive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder and dementia.  He was ultimately found permanently and totally disabled, and that decision was not a part of the case before the Court of Appeals.  During claimant's treatment for his injury, Dr. Michael March, the authorized mental health provider, recommended that claimant and his wife engage in individualized counseling. Claimant's wife was his primary caretaker and Dr. March stated that she w...

Court of Appeals Affirms Denial of Benefits, Holds Claimant Harmless for Certain Medical Expenses

The court in Ramirez-Trujillo v. Quality Egg , No. 14-0640 (Iowa App. Feb. 11, 2015) addressed issues of causation and medical expenses, and affirmed the decision of the commissioner on both grounds.  At the appeal level before the agency, the commissioner held that claimant's condition subsequent to September 30, 2009 was not the result of her work injury on August 1, 2009, and that the employer was responsible for reimbursing claimant for out of pocket medical expenses incurred after September 30, 2009, "because the employer failed to notify Ramirez-Trujillo that the care was no longer authorized as required by Iowa Code section 85.27(4)." The district court reversed the commissioner's order with respect to medical expenses and affirmed the decision of the district court on the medical causation question.  The court found that it was reasonable for the employer to deny payment for the medical costs as claimant told the employer that the treatment was for a separat...

Supreme Court Upholds Imposition of $1000 Fine for Failure to File First Report

In Denison Municipal Utilities v. Iowa Workers' Compensation Commissioner , 857 NW2d 230 (Iowa 2014), the Iowa Supreme Court upheld a $1000 fine against the employer and EMC Insurance Companies for failing to file a first report of injury.  The employer had argued successfully before the district court that it was not required to file a first report in a case where claimant had not missed any work and had made no claims of permanency.  The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court.  The court also concluded that the employer had not made a sufficient showing of good cause to avoid the $1000 assessment. The action was precipitated when claimant filed an application for alternate medical care and the agency noted that no first report was on file.  The employer was given 30 days to file a first report, but did not do so.  Before the agency the employer argued that section 86.12 only allows a penalty when the first report is required by section 86....

Supreme Court Reverses Ellingson - Finds that Multiple Healing Periods are Permissible

In Waldinger Corp. v. Mettler , 817 NW2d 1 (Iowa 2012), the Supreme Court finds that multiple healing periods are consistent with section 85.34(1) of the statute, and overrules its earlier decision in Ellingson v. Fleetguard , 599 N.W.2d 440 (Iowa 1999).  Mettler involved a relatively straightforward situation where claimant was found to have reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) by his doctors, was paid permanency benefits, and was later found to be in need of additional surgery for his ankle problems. That surgery was performed, and a few years later a third surgery was performed, following which claimant was off work from September 18, 2007 until December 7, 2007.  In addition to awarding permanency benefits, the commissioner found that claimant was entitled to healing period benefits following the third surgery.  Ultimately, the Court of Appeals concluded that the commissioner had no special expertise in interpreting the statute and held, based on Ellingson , t...

Supreme Court Decision in Gregory v. Second Injury Fund

In Gregory v. Second Injury Fund , 775 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 2010), the court addressed a number of issues that arise repeatedly in Fund cases which had not been addressed previously by the appellate courts. In Gregory , claimant suffered a first injury to both arms (bilateral carpal tunnel). At the same time she had bilateral injuries to her shoulders resulting in subacromial decompressions and distal clavicle excisions in both shoulders. She later fractured her right foot, and filed an action against the Fund. The workers' compensation commissioner concluded that an action against the Fund was not appropriate because Ms. Gregory's injuries extended beyond her extremities and into the body. The commissioner found that since this was a body as a whole injury, Fund benefits were not appropriate. The court noted that the Fund was conceived to encourage the employment of disabled persons by making the current employer responsible only for the disability the current employer c...