Iowa Workers' Compensation

  Hormel Foods Corp. v. Yunior Tamayo-Perez , No. 23-0212 (Iowa App. Dec. 20, 2023) In this procedurally confusing case, claimant initially filed for alternate medical care, with the claim later being dismissed when defendants agreed to provide care.  Claimant later filed a second application, alleging that defendants were interfering with care.  Following hearing, care in the form of the treatment recommended by the authorized physicians was ordered.  A third application was filed, seeking psychological evaluation with claimant's recommended evaluator.  The application was granted.  The second and third applications involved a spinal cord stimulator, which claimant ultimately decided not to pursue.  A fourth application was filed, asking for pain treatment and consideration of osteopathic manipulative therapy.  Defendants denied liability, based on a "stale" opinion by an orthopaedic spine physician.  The application was dismissed because of...

Stowe v. Second Injury Fund of Iowa , No. 16-0599 (Iowa App. Jan. 25, 2107) presented the somewhat unusual situation where the commissioner had disposed of a case on summary judgment grounds.  Claimant had settled her case against the employer on an agreement for settlement and in the settlement documents had indicated that the injury was an injury to the left thumb.  When claimant brought an action against the Fund, the Fund filed for summary judgment, claiming that an injury to the thumb was not a qualifying injury for SIF purposes.  The deputy and commissioner agreed and the case was dismissed. Claimant filed a petition for judicial review and the district court reversed the decision of the agency, finding that the commissioner erred in ruling as a matter of law the settlement agreement precluded claimant from seeking Fund benefits on the basis of a hand injury.  The court noted that the Fund was not a party to the settlement agreement and also found there was n...

The Court of Appeals in NID, Inc. v. Monahan, No. 14-0292 (Iowa App. March 25, 2015) grappled with questions of res judicata and judicial estoppel in the context of an alternate medical care proceeding.  The court concluded that res judicata and judicial estoppel did not apply and refused to enter sanctions against the defendants for their failure to provide care. The court begins by noting that the proceeding was "unnecessarily Dickensian in duration and procedural complexity."  Claimant had suffered an injury to his shoulder in 2007 and received treatment for that injury.  He filed a petition almost two years after the injury and at hearing the parties stipulated that claimant had suffered an injury that arose out of his employment.  The parties disputed whether claimant's medical expenses were connected to the injury.  After the arbitration hearing but before decision, claimant treated, on his own, with Dr. Neff, who recommended surgery for the left shoulde...

Cooksey v. Cargill, Inc., No. 12-1729 (Iowa App. Oct. 2, 2013), is a case in which claimant filed three alternate medical care proceedings against the employer.  In the first two proceedings, the employer agreed to provide the care sought by claimant and that care was provided.  In the first proceeding, a hearing was held, but the parties came to an agreement that claimant could see Dr. Abernathey and claimant would voluntarily dismiss his claim for alternate medical care.  In the second proceeding, claimant voluntarily dismissed before hearing because defendants agreed to provide the care requested.  In the third proceeding, the employer denied liability for the claim, after getting reports from two doctors questioning causation, and the alternate medical care hearing was dismissed under 876 IAC 4/48(7). Claimant, after having the AMC petition dismissed, filed a request for a ruling on the petition, based on due process grounds and judicial estoppel.  The dep...

In Mercy Hospital Iowa City v. Goodner , No. 12-0186 (Iowa App. Jan. 9, 2013), the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the commissioner that claimant was permanently totally disabled.  The court also concluded that defendants were judicially estopped from contesting liability for the claim, and that defendants were responsible for paying for one half of the cost of family therapy sessions for claimant.  The court reversed the finding of the agency that payment for bariatric surgery for claimant should be paid by the defendants. Claimant, a doctor was exposed to mononucleosis as a result of her work.  She later developed depression and chronic fatigue syndrome.  Defendants' doctors indicated that she may not have had mononucleosis, but did have fatigue and memory loss.  Claimant's doctors indicated that she had developed mononucleosis and this was one of a multitude of triggers for chronic fatigue syndrome.  Following these developments, claimant bega...