Iowa Workers' Compensation

This case began when the Core Group of the Iowa Association for Justice requested the commissioner to enter a declaratory order holding that employers must, under section 85.27(2) of the Iowa Code, provide surveillance materials as a part of normal discovery, and must provide these materials prior to claimant's deposition.  The commissioner found in favor of the Core Group and the Iowa Insurance Institute and others appealed to the district court.  The district court and Court of Appeals affirmed.  In Iowa Insurance Institute et al. v. Core Group etc. and Godfrey , No. 13-1627 (Iowa June 12, 2015), the Supreme Court, in a 5-1 decision , reversed the decision of the commissioner.  The court concludes that the disclosure provisions of section 85.27(2) are "limited to health-care related privileges such as the physician-patient privilege." The court first addressed the procedural mechanism for the grant of a declaratory order under section 17A.9 of the Iowa Code and 8...

In Grahovic v. Second Injury Fund of Iowa , No. 14-1295 (Iowa App.  June 10, 2015), the court was presented with a situation where claimant sought review of an earlier denial of a claim against the Fund.  Claimant had suffered multiple scheduled injuries, but liability of the SIF had been denied previously.  The court found that a review reopening was improper in the circumstances of the case. Claimant had a left leg injury in 1997, and a right leg injury in 2001.  He settled a claim against the Fund in 2003 on a closed file basis.  Claimant later had an injury to his left knee in 2005.  He brought a claim against the Fund with the left knee injury of 2005 being the second injury and the right leg injury of 2001 being the first injury.  He settled with the employer and went to hearing against the Fund.  The agency found that claimant failed to prove his left leg injury and even if he did, had failed to prove that this caused permanent disability...

In H.J. Heating and Cooling v. Dahlen , No. 14-1100 (Iowa App. June 10, 2015), the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the commissioner finding that claimant was permanently and totally disabled.  The fighting issue in the case was whether the unrebutted testimony of an electrician hired by defendants which indicated it was impossible for claimant to be shocked in the manner he indicated was to be credited.  The commissioner discredited that testimony and found permanent total disability. Claimant was working for a heating and cooling company and was walking outside through tall wet grass and plants when he touched metal and testified he was shocked.  This caused him to fall and break a window well cover and aggravated an underlying back condition.  The agency concluded that claimant was permanently and totally disabled. At hearing, the employer presented the testimony of a master electrician that it was not possible for claimant to have been shocked by the...

The Supreme Court, in DART v. Young , No. 14-0231 (Iowa June 5, 2015) , held that an independent medical evaluation under section 85.39 could not be completely paid under the "costs" section of the commissioner's administrative rules at 876 IAC 4.33(6).  The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, although discussing the issue in more detail.  The case was decided on a 4-3 vote, with Justices Hecht, Appel and Zager in dissent. The facts in DART  were relatively straightforward.  Defendants accepted claimant's back injury, but did not obtain a rating of impairment under section 85.39.  Claimant obtained an evaluation of her own, and sought to tax the expense of this evaluation as costs under 876 IAC 4.33(6).  The commissioner and the district court ordered that the evaluation to be paid in full under 4.33(6), and the district court affirmed.  The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that ordering payment for the exam as costs would defeat t...

In Roberts Dairy v. Billick , 861 N.W.2d 814 (Iowa 2015), the Supreme Court held that when a claimant has a first compensable injury with one employer, and later has a second compensable claim with a different employer, the fresh start rule applies with the change of employment and the second claim is not apportioned against the first injury.  In that case, the court concluded that "because Billick gained a fresh start when he began his employment with Roberts in 2001, Roberts is not entitled to apportion its liability for permanent partial disability benefits in this case."   Id.  at 825. In Warren Properties v. Stewart , No. 13-0474 (Iowa May 29, 2015), the court was presented with similar arguments concerning apportionment, with the exception that claimant suffered her first injury while working at Wal-Mart concurrently with her employment at Warren Properties.  Claimant subsequently left her job at Wal-Mart following her back injury, but continued to work at Wa...

A series of commissioners has held that when an authorized treating physician recommends treatment that treatment is deemed to be authorized under 85.27(4) of the Iowa Code.  In Lynch Livestock v. Bursell, No. 14-1133 (Iowa App. May 20, 2015), the Iowa Court of Appeals turns this longstanding agency rule on its head and concludes that in the context of an alternate medical care proceeding, the claimant must demonstrate that the care offered by the employer is unreasonable, notwithstanding that the care sought is recommended by the authorized treating physician.  The decision of the court of appeals could well sound the death knell of a large portion of alternate medical care proceedings by destroying the authorized physician rule. In Mr. Bursell's case, Dr. Cook, an authorized treating physician, diagnosed claimant with CRPS and referred him to Dr. Kelly, a vascular surgeon.  Dr. Kelly recommended a lumbar sympathectomy.  Defendants subsequently sent claimant to ot...

In Pella Corp. v. Winn , No. 14-0771 (Iowa App. May 6, 2015), the Court of Appeals addressed issues concerning the date of injury in the context of a cumulative injury, and notice issues associated with the date of injury.  Claimant was awarded benefits by the agency, but the district court concluded that the agency had failed to use the correct legal test in determining the date of the cumulative injury.  The district court remanded the case to the agency and found that the employer was entitled to assert an untimely notice defense on appeal.  The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that the correct legal test was not used, but also finds that the notice defense could not be considered on remand. Claimant had a left shoulder injury and returned to work after that injury.  She began having problems in the right shoulder and saw a nurse practitioner for the problem on June 1, 2010.  Following an MRI, a rotator cuff tear in the right shoulder was als...