Iowa Workers' Compensation

Over the years, a number of trucking companies have required, as a condition of employment, that drivers' agree that when they are released to light duty work, they will accept treatment in Iowa.  In Roland v Annett Holdings, Inc. , No. 18-1092 (Iowa March 20, 2020), the Supreme Court addressed such a memorandum of understanding in the context of a class action challenge to such proceedings. Claimant was a driver for Annett, where he was injured.  He had signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) agreeing to short-term light duty and treatment in Iowa.  His initial treatment was in Alabama, where he lived.  His doctor prescribed a certain type of therapy with a cooling machine.  The employer sought to have claimant return to Iowa for treatment, but he could not travel by air with the machine and could not keep the electricity on for the machine while driving.  The employer required claimant to return to Iowa.  Claimant filed an alternate medical ca...

In Ditsworth v. Icon Ag , No. 19-0703 (Iowa App. March 18, 2020), the commissioner affirmed an a total award of 50% based on the apportionment of two injuries with the same employer.  The first injury was settled by the parties and the second injury resulted in a total award of 50%, with an additional 30% awarded for the second injury. Claimant appealed the commissioner’s decision, apparently arguing that since different insurers were involved, apportionment should not have occurred and claimant should have received 50% for the second injury.  The court agreed with the commissioner and noted that 85.34(7)(b).  Citing Roberts Dairy v. Billick , the court found the language of 85.34(7)(b) required apportionment. The decision of the commissioner was affirmed.

The case of Thornton v. Interstate Insurance Company , No. 18-0809 (Iowa Feb. 28, 2020) came before the supreme court for a second time.  In the first proceeding, the court had remanded the action for a new assessment of compensatory and punitive damages. 897 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa 2017). In the second trial, damages were set at $382,000 and punitive damages at $6,750,000.  Reductions to both damage amounts were made by the court in this action. The reduction in compensatory damages came about primarily because the court concluded that bad faith had not been shown with respect to the carrier's delayed provision of a wheelchair for claimant.  The court observed that although an order for a wheelchair was provided by the doctor, this was not forwarded to the carrier until after a mobility test was conducted (some ten weeks later) and so bad faith did not apply.  Ultimately, the court reduced compensatory damages to $58,452.42 for attorney's fees and mental pain and suff...