Iowa Workers' Compensation

Acting on a certified question of law from the federal district court, the Supreme Court in De Dios v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America and Broadspire Services, Inc. , No. 18-1227 (Iowa May 10, 2019) concluded that a bad faith action was not proper against a third party administrator because the administrator did not possess the attributes that have led to the imposition of bad faith liability The dispute arose out of a workers' compensation claim in which plaintiff  sued both the insurance carrier and 3d party administrator for bad faith.  The court found that the bad faith cause of action arises from: 1) the special contractual relationship between the insurer and insured, 2) the specific statutory duties imposed on insurers, or  3)some combination of the two.  Because a 3d party administrator did not possess these attributes, according to the court, bad faith liability against that entity was improper. The court canvasses the law of bad faith, both gen...

In Ortiz v. Loyd Roling Construction , No. 18-0047 (Iowa May 24, 2019), the Supreme Court reversed earlier rulings that held that service of a petition for judicial review was not timely when served via email rather than regular mail.  The IAPA, section 17A.19(2), provides that it is a jurisdictional requirement for petitioner to mail a copy of the petition to all attorneys of record.  In this case, petitioner emailed a copy of the petition in a timely manner, but did not mail the petition within 10 days as required by statute.  Both the district court and court of appeals held that since the statute did not discuss the emailing of the petition service was untimely and the petition was dismissed.  The Supreme Court reverses and discusses the fact that when the statute was enacted in 1981, email was virtually unknown.  The court also notes that most discussions between attorneys in 2019 occurs via email and that there has been a change such that email is the "r...

In Niday v. Roehl Transport, Inc. , No. 18-0712 (Iowa App. April 3, 2019), the court addressed section 85.71(1)(b) of the Iowa Code and concluded that since the contract of hire between claimant and the employer had been made entirely in Iowa, jurisdiction under Iowa workers' compensation law was appropriate in Iowa.  Claimant changed careers when in his 50's received his CDL in Iowa and saw an ad for Roehl in Iowa.  Roehl did not have a terminal or a drop lot in Iowa.  Claimant applied online and was told that he was preliminarily qualified for the position, which first required various medical testing.  A car was rented for claimant in Iowa and he was to drive to Wisconsin (headquarters for Roehl).  Claimant reported to Gary, Indiana for classroom training. Claimant passed this training and was assigned a driver for on the road training throughout the U.S.  Claimant retrieved a truck in Indiana and drove home to Iowa in the truck. Claimant's route infor...

In Gumm v. Easter Seal Society of Iowa, Inc., No. 18-1051 (Iowa App. May 15, 2019), the Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the commissioner and district court and held that a claimant was not required to prove a discrete and distinct injury to prove a cumulative injury had occurred.  Claimant had suffered and injury to her right ankle in 2008 and was provided with a 17% rating for this injury.  She returned to work following the injury.  In 2014, claimant filed another petition, alleging that she had sustained a cumulative injury to the right ankle following her return to work.  The commissioner concluded that claimant had not suffered a distinct and discrete injury and held that under Ellingson , the failure to demonstrate such an injury defeated her claim.  The commissioner found that the deterioration of claimant's ankle condition was a sequella of the initial injury and was not compensable, as claimant was outside the statute on limitations on ...

In Dubinovic v. Des Moines Public Schools , No. 18-0194 (Iowa App. May 15, 2019), the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed a decision finding that claimant had not demonstrated a mental/mental injury under Dunleavy   and Brown  v. Quik Trip.  Claimant had argued that the Supreme Court's standard in Dunleavy was inconsistent with the workers' compensation law.  The court declines to address this issue, as they are not in a position to overrule existing precedent.  The court finds that the agency correctly held that claimant had not met the Dunleavy standard. The court also addressed the question of whether claimant had demonstrated he met the Brown  standard, which does not require a showing of additional stress if there is an event of a sudden traumatic nature precipitating the mental injury.  The court found that substantial evidence supported the agency's finding that there was no such traumatic event.  The court also found that the failure to ...