Iowa Workers' Compensation

In John Deere Dubuque Works v. Caven , No. 1-286 (Iowa App. 2011), the Court of Appeals interpreted the commissioner's rule on costs, 876 IAC 4.33(6), for the first time.  In the underlying decision in Caven , the commissioner concluded that the rule, which allows the hearing deputy, in his or her discretion, to award the "reasonable costs of obtaining no more the two doctors' or practitioners' reports," was not limited to payment of $150.00 for a doctors' or practiioners' report.  Prior to the Caven decision, the commissioner's office had interpreted 4.33(6) as being limited to $150.00, similar to 876 IAC 4.33(5), despite the fact that the language of the rule contained no such limitation. The argument made before the court on appeal was that the commissioner exceeded his authority in allowing payment for the entire cost of obtaining two reports.  The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that section 86.40 of the Code indicates that all costs before ...

In The Cincinnati Insurance Companies v. Kirk , No. 0-950 (Iowa App. May 25, 2011), the Court of Appeals concluded that the district court had jurisdiction to hear claims made against the claimant for unjust enrichment and fraud after claimant allegedly fraudulently received medical and indemnity benefits from the workers' compensation carrier.  The facts of the case are unusual, and the decision of the Court of Appeals should be seen in that light. Claimant suffered an injury to his left arm, and was provided with medical treatment and indemnity benefits.  The insurance carrier decided to conduct surveillance when the healing process did not go as smoothly as expected.  That surveillance allegedly revealed that claimant, prior to an appointment with his workers' compensation physician, was seen striking his injured left arm repeatedly while sitting in his car.  Following this surveillance, the carrier filed claims for fraudulent representation, unjust enrichment, ...

The case of Second Injury Fund of Iowa v. Armstrong , No. 1-280 (Iowa App. May 25, 2011), although discussing primarily the question of whether claimant's injury extended into the body as a whole, potentially broadens the scope of Fund claims to include claims involving the same extremity, such as a right hand and right arm or left foot and left leg.  These types of injuries, under Anderson v. Second Injury Fund of Iowa, 262 N.W.2d 789 (Iowa 1978), had previously been found not compensable by the Supreme Court. In Armstrong, claimant's first injury was to the left foot.  In 2005, his left leg was crushed, resulting in further injury.  The treating doctor also found that there was a skin injury, but this doctor later opined that this injury was confined to the lower extremity.  There had also been a finding that claimant had a neuropathy, but again the treating doctor and IME doctor found that this did not extend into the body as a whole. The Fund argued that clai...

The case of Bluff Harbor Marina v. Wunnenberg , No. 1-095 (Iowa App. May 25, 2011), presented an issue that is not common, but can have major consequences for claimants.  This involved the competing jurisdiction for a work injury under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) and Iowa's Workers' Compensation statute. Claimant suffered a tragic accident that led to his death.  He was the manager of a marina along the Mississippi, and decided to remove a torn canopy using the bucket and boom of a mini-excavator.  He positioned the excavator by driving it along ramps, which slipped, spilled the excavator into the water, and killed the claimant.  Claimant filed an action under Iowa's workers' compensation laws. Defendants argued that jurisdiction was appropriate under the LHWCA, and urged that the claim be dismissed.  The commissioner rejected this argument and found in favor of the claimant on the death claim.  In addressing this issue, t...

In ABCM Corp. v. Manning , No. 1-225 (Iowa App.  May 25, 2011), the court addressed the issue of cumulative injuries, and the further question of when those injuries became manifest.  Claimant suffered injuries to her knees and low back, which ultimately led to knee replacement surgery.  The commissioner found that claimant was not aware of the compensable nature of her injuries until after she had left employment, and rejected defendants' arguments that they had improper notice and that the statute of limitations had run. The court noted that the questions of the nature, seriousness and possible compensable character of the injury under Herrera  was a question of fact under Midwest Ambulance v. Ruud .  Here, the commissioner had a substantial degree of latitude in determining when the claimant should have known, as a reasonable person, when her injuries were compensable.  There was no error of law in finding that claimant did not know about compensabilit...