Iowa Workers' Compensation

Reflecting the focus on the budget and economic issues, the 2010 General Assembly passed nothing of import relating to workers' compensation. A number of bills had been on the table, including the following: - Choice of Doctor - Use of Assets in Second Injury Fund to Reimburse Commissioner - Allowing consideration of certain scheduled injuries industrially where earning capacity was negatively impacted - Including the full value of overtime in determining WC rates - Allowing for cost of living adjustments for certain claims - Modification of alternate care procedures for medical treatment - Denying coverage for certain willful acts - Excluding injuries incurred in voluntary recreational programs Because the 2010 session was the second year of the session, all of these bills will need to start from ground zero if they are introduced again. Thus, certain bills that have already passed one chamber will have to begin the process again in the newly constituted Senate and Ho

A recent decision addressing §85.34(7) of the Code has been issued.  In Quaker Oats v. Main , No. 08-1507 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan 22, 2010), 2010 WL 200420, the Court of Appeals addressed two issues regarding the apportionment section of the workers’ compensation law.  The court found that §85.34(7) applied to successive injuries with the same employer as long as one of the injuries occurred after September 7, 2004, the effective date of the legislation.  The commissioner had earlier ruled in Main that both injuries had to take place after September 7, 2004 in order for the legislation to apply, but the district court reversed this finding, and this conclusion was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Main court also addressed the issue of the constitutionality of the provisions of House File 2581 that resulted in the legislation codified as §85.34(7).  The legislation had been attacked as being violative of the single subject provisions of the Iowa Constitution, Art. III, sec. 29.  The

In Schutjer v. Algona Manor Care Center , 780 NW2d 549 (Iowa 2010), the court was faced with four issues: 1) the correct rate; 2) whether TTD and TPD benefits were owed; 3) entitlement to PPD benefits; and 4) penalty. The commissioner had agreed with the employer on all four of these issues, but the district court determined that the rate had been improperly calculated and that the commissioner had incorrectly refused to provide temporary benefits for certain days between 12/2/02 and 1/4/03. In view of the decision on the rate issue, the district court remanded the penalty issue to the commissioner. The court of appeals agreed with the district court insofar as the above items were concerned ( TTD , rate, penalty), but also concluded that the commissioner had not properly analyzed the question of Schutjer's eligibility for temporary benefits after she left work on 1/5/03, and had failed to provide adequate detail concerning the decision that there was no permanent disabil

The decision in Second Injury Fund of Iowa v. Kratzer , 778 N.W.2d 42 (Iowa 2010) followed close on the heals of the decision in Gregory v. Fund , which addressed similar issues. In Kratzer , claimant suffered an injury to both legs and lower back in 1994, which ultimately resulted in a decision by the commissioner, affirmed on appeal, of a 20% industrial disability. In 2002, claimant had another injury to her left leg, which was settled with the employer just before hearing. The arbitration decision found a first and second injury, and awarded 40% industrial disability. On appeal before the commissioner, the finding of first and second injuries was maintained, but the award was increased to permanent total disability under the odd-lot doctrine. On judicial review, the district court concluded that although claimant's first injury to the right leg was a qualifying injury, the injury to the left leg in 2002 was not because the same member was injured in the 1994 accident (a bi

In Gregory v. Second Injury Fund , 775 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 2010), the court addressed a number of issues that arise repeatedly in Fund cases which had not been addressed previously by the appellate courts. In Gregory , claimant suffered a first injury to both arms (bilateral carpal tunnel). At the same time she had bilateral injuries to her shoulders resulting in subacromial decompressions and distal clavicle excisions in both shoulders. She later fractured her right foot, and filed an action against the Fund. The workers' compensation commissioner concluded that an action against the Fund was not appropriate because Ms. Gregory's injuries extended beyond her extremities and into the body. The commissioner found that since this was a body as a whole injury, Fund benefits were not appropriate. The court noted that the Fund was conceived to encourage the employment of disabled persons by making the current employer responsible only for the disability the current employer c

The Burress case involved a claimant with brucellosis, which was contracted by exposure to hog blood. The Supreme Court concluded that brucellosis, despite being specifically mentioned in Chapter 85A, was an injury under Chapter 85 in Mr. Burress' case. IBP, Inc. v. Burress , 779 NW2d 210 (Iowa 2010). According to the court, an injury has its origin in a specific identifiable trauma or series of such occurrences. A disease, which is compensable under Chapter 85A, originates from a source that is neither traumatic nor physical. The court engaged in an extensive discussion of the types of diseases that are occupational diseases and not injuries. They noted that in other states, the contraction of brucellosis had been found to be "an accidental injury rather than an occupational disease. The court relied on the findings of the hearing deputy that Mr. Burress' exposures were most likely due to a cut on his hands and exposure to blood that was "sudden, traumatic

On March 5, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Bell Brothers Heating and Air Conditioning v. Gwinn , 779 NW2d 193 (Iowa 2010). The case involved the proof required by the employee to establish a claim for benefits and expenses on account of medical care obtained by the employee, but not authorized by the employer or the commissioner. Mr. Gwinn had obtained non-authorized care (surgery) a week before the arbitration hearing. The court noted that the employer generally had the right to control care (the so-called authorization defense), but that the statute allowed the employee to choose care in certain emergency situations, when the employer and employee agreed to alternate medical care, and when the commissioner approved alternate medical care. The court concluded, however, that the employer's right to select the medical care did not prevent the employee from choosing medical care at his or her own expense under two circumstances. The first circumstance is when the