Court of Appeals Affirms Commissioner's Decision in Discovery Rule Case
In Menard, Inc. v. Simmer, No. 14-2078 (Iowa App. Aug. 19, 2015), the Court of Appeals affirmed a finding that under the discovery rule, claimant had provided timely notice of his injury.
As a part of his work with Menard's, claimant was required to carry goods from the store to customers cars. These loads weighed up to 300 pounds. In 2008 and 2009, claimant began to experience pain in his feet and up to his thighs while working. By April of 2010, pain had spread to claimant's lower back, and claimant's physician referred him to the Minnesota Back Institute. In May of 2010, claimant learned for the first time that he had scoliosis. He was provided with an injection and therapy and returned to Menard's without restriction. By early 2012, claimant's back problems had worsened and the doctor at Minnesota Back Institute indicated that his employment may have led to his worsening back condition. He also performed surgery on March 7, 2012.
Claimant was released to work with restrictions on June 4, 2012. He returned to work, but had intense pain. This was the last day he worked for Menard's. Claimant's petition was filed on June 27, 2012. Dr. Mehbod at Minnesota Back Institute found that claimant's condition had been aggravated by his work. Dr. Mendoza found that wear and tear could occur regardless of the type of occupation. Dr. Miller, claimant's IME, found aggravation and Dr. Boarini found that work was not a specific aggravating factor. Dr. Mooney also found the injury was not work related.
The deputy found that claimant reasonably would have become aware of the nature, seriousness and probable compensable character of the injury on June 4, 2012. The deputy found that claimant's cumulative injury had been aggravated by his employment, which entitled him to benefits. The commissioner affirmed, as did the district court.
Defendants' argued that the question of the date of injury/timely notice question was not a question of fact but a question of application of law to fact. The court rejected defendants' argument on substantial evidence grounds. The court noted that the commissioner had notice that his condition was caused by employment on February 9, 2012, but did not know that the injury would have a permanent impact on employment until June 4, 2012, when he was unable to work for more than an hour after being returned to work. The court concluded that a reasonable person could have believed that he would have made a substantial recovery from his injury and surgery. The court also concluded that claimant took reasonable steps to learn the nature and seriousness of his injury, and noted that until his surgery, claimant had continued to work.
The court distinguished Swartzendruber v. Schmimmel, 813 N.W.2d 646, 650 (Iowa 2000) because in that case claimant could hardly walk soon after his injury and he visited the emergency room the day after the injury. Here, claimant never had an ER visit and was initially told he would not need surgery. The court concluded that there was substantial evidence to support the agency's determination that claimant discovered the seriousness of his condition on June 4, 2012. Therefore, he provided timely notice.
On the question of causation, Menard's argued that because the finding of causation was contrary to substantial evidence in the record, it must be reversed. The court noted that this was a misapprehension of the scope of review. Under Mike Brooks v. House and other cases, the question is whether there exists in the medical record substantial evidence supporting the agency's findings. There was clearly evidence to support the finding in the opinions of Dr. Mehbod and Dr. Miller. Therefore, substantial evidence existed. The decision of the agency was affirmed.
As a part of his work with Menard's, claimant was required to carry goods from the store to customers cars. These loads weighed up to 300 pounds. In 2008 and 2009, claimant began to experience pain in his feet and up to his thighs while working. By April of 2010, pain had spread to claimant's lower back, and claimant's physician referred him to the Minnesota Back Institute. In May of 2010, claimant learned for the first time that he had scoliosis. He was provided with an injection and therapy and returned to Menard's without restriction. By early 2012, claimant's back problems had worsened and the doctor at Minnesota Back Institute indicated that his employment may have led to his worsening back condition. He also performed surgery on March 7, 2012.
Claimant was released to work with restrictions on June 4, 2012. He returned to work, but had intense pain. This was the last day he worked for Menard's. Claimant's petition was filed on June 27, 2012. Dr. Mehbod at Minnesota Back Institute found that claimant's condition had been aggravated by his work. Dr. Mendoza found that wear and tear could occur regardless of the type of occupation. Dr. Miller, claimant's IME, found aggravation and Dr. Boarini found that work was not a specific aggravating factor. Dr. Mooney also found the injury was not work related.
The deputy found that claimant reasonably would have become aware of the nature, seriousness and probable compensable character of the injury on June 4, 2012. The deputy found that claimant's cumulative injury had been aggravated by his employment, which entitled him to benefits. The commissioner affirmed, as did the district court.
Defendants' argued that the question of the date of injury/timely notice question was not a question of fact but a question of application of law to fact. The court rejected defendants' argument on substantial evidence grounds. The court noted that the commissioner had notice that his condition was caused by employment on February 9, 2012, but did not know that the injury would have a permanent impact on employment until June 4, 2012, when he was unable to work for more than an hour after being returned to work. The court concluded that a reasonable person could have believed that he would have made a substantial recovery from his injury and surgery. The court also concluded that claimant took reasonable steps to learn the nature and seriousness of his injury, and noted that until his surgery, claimant had continued to work.
The court distinguished Swartzendruber v. Schmimmel, 813 N.W.2d 646, 650 (Iowa 2000) because in that case claimant could hardly walk soon after his injury and he visited the emergency room the day after the injury. Here, claimant never had an ER visit and was initially told he would not need surgery. The court concluded that there was substantial evidence to support the agency's determination that claimant discovered the seriousness of his condition on June 4, 2012. Therefore, he provided timely notice.
On the question of causation, Menard's argued that because the finding of causation was contrary to substantial evidence in the record, it must be reversed. The court noted that this was a misapprehension of the scope of review. Under Mike Brooks v. House and other cases, the question is whether there exists in the medical record substantial evidence supporting the agency's findings. There was clearly evidence to support the finding in the opinions of Dr. Mehbod and Dr. Miller. Therefore, substantial evidence existed. The decision of the agency was affirmed.
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