Court of Appeals Affirms 5% Industrial Disability Award
In Lampman v. Crystal, Inc., No. 14-1983 (Iowa App. 2015), claimant challenged a 5% industrial disability award as being too low. On substantial evidence grounds, the Court of Appeals affirmed the commissioner's award.
Claimant injured her back lifting residents at a care center. Claimant had a history of back problems, but had a specific incident on May 9, 2009. She was fired by the nursing home two days after the incident. The back injury was accepted and Dr. Miller ultimately indicated that claimant had an impairment of 1% to 2% of the lumbar back and released her without restrictions. Dr. Miller indicated that he did not believe claimant would get worse "as she is not working." Dr. Jones performed an IME, provided a 5% impairment rating and imposed restrictions of lifting no more than 30 pounds occasionally and 15 pounds frequently. He did not believe that claimant could perform her former duties as a CNA. Claimant also saw Dr. McGuire, who agreed with the 5% rating and prescribed a cane and a walker.
Claimant was also seen by Dr. Ransdell and Dr. Boarini. Dr. Boarini indicated that the effects of a back strain should have resolved within two to three months. He noted that claimant was not fit to perform heavy work although he did not believe she had a permanent injury or permanent impairment. An FCE obtained by claimant placed her in the sedentary work category. Claimant did not attend an FCE set up by defendants. Two vocational reports were presented, with Kent Jayne opining that there was no reasonable likelihood claimant was competitively employable and Lana Sellner indicating that there were various jobs claimant could perform.
The deputy awarded a 5% industrial award and this conclusion was adopted by the commissioner. On judicial review, claimant argued she was permanently totally disabled or had suffered at least a 70% industrial disability. The district court remanded the case to the commissioner because the agency had failed to consider all of the factors bearing on claimant's employability. On remand, the commissioner's designee indicated that he did not credit claimant's testimony or the opinions of the doctors who had based their findings on the claimant's statements concerning her impairment. The 5% award was affirmed.
The district court in the second judicial review action affirmed the decision of the agency. On appeal, the court noted that it gave deference to the commissioner's credibility determinations. The court criticized the agency's decision on remand, indicating that the commissioner's designee had "expressed its consideration" of the industrial disability factors "in just two sentences." The court then noted, however, that there was no weighting that needed to be given to each industrial disability factor, and concluded that since the extent of disability was a fact determination and there were sufficient facts to support the conclusion of the agency, the action would be affirmed. The court found substantial evidence to support the decision of the agency and also concluded that the decision of the agency was not irrational, illogical or wholly unjustifiable. The court also concluded that the agency's action was not an abuse of discretion.
Claimant injured her back lifting residents at a care center. Claimant had a history of back problems, but had a specific incident on May 9, 2009. She was fired by the nursing home two days after the incident. The back injury was accepted and Dr. Miller ultimately indicated that claimant had an impairment of 1% to 2% of the lumbar back and released her without restrictions. Dr. Miller indicated that he did not believe claimant would get worse "as she is not working." Dr. Jones performed an IME, provided a 5% impairment rating and imposed restrictions of lifting no more than 30 pounds occasionally and 15 pounds frequently. He did not believe that claimant could perform her former duties as a CNA. Claimant also saw Dr. McGuire, who agreed with the 5% rating and prescribed a cane and a walker.
Claimant was also seen by Dr. Ransdell and Dr. Boarini. Dr. Boarini indicated that the effects of a back strain should have resolved within two to three months. He noted that claimant was not fit to perform heavy work although he did not believe she had a permanent injury or permanent impairment. An FCE obtained by claimant placed her in the sedentary work category. Claimant did not attend an FCE set up by defendants. Two vocational reports were presented, with Kent Jayne opining that there was no reasonable likelihood claimant was competitively employable and Lana Sellner indicating that there were various jobs claimant could perform.
The deputy awarded a 5% industrial award and this conclusion was adopted by the commissioner. On judicial review, claimant argued she was permanently totally disabled or had suffered at least a 70% industrial disability. The district court remanded the case to the commissioner because the agency had failed to consider all of the factors bearing on claimant's employability. On remand, the commissioner's designee indicated that he did not credit claimant's testimony or the opinions of the doctors who had based their findings on the claimant's statements concerning her impairment. The 5% award was affirmed.
The district court in the second judicial review action affirmed the decision of the agency. On appeal, the court noted that it gave deference to the commissioner's credibility determinations. The court criticized the agency's decision on remand, indicating that the commissioner's designee had "expressed its consideration" of the industrial disability factors "in just two sentences." The court then noted, however, that there was no weighting that needed to be given to each industrial disability factor, and concluded that since the extent of disability was a fact determination and there were sufficient facts to support the conclusion of the agency, the action would be affirmed. The court found substantial evidence to support the decision of the agency and also concluded that the decision of the agency was not irrational, illogical or wholly unjustifiable. The court also concluded that the agency's action was not an abuse of discretion.
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