Supreme Court Holds That Disclose of Surveillance is not Required Prior to Claimant's Deposition
This case began when the Core Group of the Iowa Association for Justice requested the commissioner to enter a declaratory order holding that employers must, under section 85.27(2) of the Iowa Code, provide surveillance materials as a part of normal discovery, and must provide these materials prior to claimant's deposition. The commissioner found in favor of the Core Group and the Iowa Insurance Institute and others appealed to the district court. The district court and Court of Appeals affirmed. In Iowa Insurance Institute et al. v. Core Group etc. and Godfrey, No. 13-1627 (Iowa June 12, 2015), the Supreme Court, in a 5-1 decision , reversed the decision of the commissioner. The court concludes that the disclosure provisions of section 85.27(2) are "limited to health-care related privileges such as the physician-patient privilege."
The court first addressed the procedural mechanism for the grant of a declaratory order under section 17A.9 of the Iowa Code and 876 IAC 5.1. Core Group had asked the commissioner for a declaratory order and this was opposed by various employers' representatives and insurance interests. The Supreme Court noted the broad powers the agencies had to issue declaratory orders, and the specific situations in which declaratory orders were not to be provided. The court noted that Professor Bonfield had noted that declaratory orders were to be issued unless the order would be in conflict with an agency rule or substantially prejudiced the rights of parties who were indispensable parties to the proceedings. The court concluded that the agency did not abuse its discretion in issuing the declaratory order and all parties necessary had been a part of the proceedings. Accordingly,
the court found the commissioner was within his rights in issuing the declaratory ruling.
On the merits, the court noted that section 85.27(2) provides that "all information . . . concerning the employee's physical or mental condition relative to the claim . . . " is to be produced. The court indicated that Core Group's position was that there was a waiver of any privilege as to such materials and that appellant's position was that only health care records were subject to disclosure rules. The court noted that work product rules under IRCP 1.503(3) protected the disclosure of the mental impressions of the party's attorney. The court stated that there were two tiers of work product - the lower tier allowed for discovery upon a showing of substantial need and undue hardship and the upper tier insulated the mental impressions of the attorney.
The court concluded that surveillance materials were protected lower tier materials. The court further noted that surveillance lost the status of protected work product "once a determination is made that the surveillance will be used at trial." The court next analyzed 85.27(2), asking whether the disclosure requirements were ambiguous. The court noted that other sections of the statute related to health care services, and not broader disclosure requirements. The court stated that the provisions of 85.27(2) were consistent with other provisions in section 85.27 that related to health care services, and not "all information . . . relative to the claim." The court posed this as an ambiguity in the statute. The court then found that "all" does not always mean "all" and is not always all-inclusive.
The court then concludes that if the Core Group's position were to be enforced and "all information" meant "all information," then Core Group's interpretation would eliminate all privileges and protections. The court found this to be an "absurd result." Ultimately, the court concluded that section 85.27(2) was not directed at anything other than health care services, and did not apply to surveillance materials.
The dissent by Justice Hecht agreed that the case was properly before the court. He concludes that "all information" really does mean "all information," and notes that decisions before the court had given that term a very broad reading. Furthermore, no workers' compensation cases had limited the use of the word "all" in the manner of the majority. Justice Hecht reads the statute to mean what it says, and finds that the "all information" includes surveillance materials. He notes that the declaratory order did not abolish all privileges, and did not compromise work product, but only required the divulgence of surveillance materials. He concludes that the commissioner correctly required parties in a worker's compensation proceeding to release surveillance materials upon request and would affirm the district and appeals court decisions.
The court first addressed the procedural mechanism for the grant of a declaratory order under section 17A.9 of the Iowa Code and 876 IAC 5.1. Core Group had asked the commissioner for a declaratory order and this was opposed by various employers' representatives and insurance interests. The Supreme Court noted the broad powers the agencies had to issue declaratory orders, and the specific situations in which declaratory orders were not to be provided. The court noted that Professor Bonfield had noted that declaratory orders were to be issued unless the order would be in conflict with an agency rule or substantially prejudiced the rights of parties who were indispensable parties to the proceedings. The court concluded that the agency did not abuse its discretion in issuing the declaratory order and all parties necessary had been a part of the proceedings. Accordingly,
the court found the commissioner was within his rights in issuing the declaratory ruling.
On the merits, the court noted that section 85.27(2) provides that "all information . . . concerning the employee's physical or mental condition relative to the claim . . . " is to be produced. The court indicated that Core Group's position was that there was a waiver of any privilege as to such materials and that appellant's position was that only health care records were subject to disclosure rules. The court noted that work product rules under IRCP 1.503(3) protected the disclosure of the mental impressions of the party's attorney. The court stated that there were two tiers of work product - the lower tier allowed for discovery upon a showing of substantial need and undue hardship and the upper tier insulated the mental impressions of the attorney.
The court concluded that surveillance materials were protected lower tier materials. The court further noted that surveillance lost the status of protected work product "once a determination is made that the surveillance will be used at trial." The court next analyzed 85.27(2), asking whether the disclosure requirements were ambiguous. The court noted that other sections of the statute related to health care services, and not broader disclosure requirements. The court stated that the provisions of 85.27(2) were consistent with other provisions in section 85.27 that related to health care services, and not "all information . . . relative to the claim." The court posed this as an ambiguity in the statute. The court then found that "all" does not always mean "all" and is not always all-inclusive.
The court then concludes that if the Core Group's position were to be enforced and "all information" meant "all information," then Core Group's interpretation would eliminate all privileges and protections. The court found this to be an "absurd result." Ultimately, the court concluded that section 85.27(2) was not directed at anything other than health care services, and did not apply to surveillance materials.
The dissent by Justice Hecht agreed that the case was properly before the court. He concludes that "all information" really does mean "all information," and notes that decisions before the court had given that term a very broad reading. Furthermore, no workers' compensation cases had limited the use of the word "all" in the manner of the majority. Justice Hecht reads the statute to mean what it says, and finds that the "all information" includes surveillance materials. He notes that the declaratory order did not abolish all privileges, and did not compromise work product, but only required the divulgence of surveillance materials. He concludes that the commissioner correctly required parties in a worker's compensation proceeding to release surveillance materials upon request and would affirm the district and appeals court decisions.
Comments
Post a Comment