Court of Appeals Decides Successive Disability Case
In Hansen v. Snap-On Tools Manufacturing Company, No. 12-1038 (Iowa App. Feb. 27, 2013), among the issues addressed by the court was the questions of successive disabilities under section 85.34(7)(b) of the Code. The court seems to conclude that section 85.34(7)(b) does not apply to unscheduled injuries, which would, if affirmed, have a serious impact on the current law concerning that section of the act.
Hansen also addresses issues concerning costs, extent of impairment, healing period and temporary partial benefits.
Claimant sustained two injuries at work, a left shoulder injury in 2005 and an injury to her right hand and arm in 2007 which was traumatic. The shoulder injury was cumulative, although there was medical evidence that there was a later acute injury to the shoulder superimposed on the cumulative process. The commissioner concluded that claimant was entitled to 15% industrial disability, did not specifically accept or reject claimant's computation of healing period/TPD benefits, and reduced the costs payable for the IME from $9,502.50 to $2,890. At the district court level, the healing period issue and IME costs issues were remanded to the agency. At the district court, claimant argued that the successive disability statute was unconstitutional and the district court deferred ruling on this issue.
Claimant argued to the court of appeals that the agency had failed to apply the successive disability statute and material principles of industrial disability. Claimant argued that an earlier right shoulder restriction should have been combined with the left shoulder restrictions in determining industrial disability. The statute notes that if a preexisting disability was compensable under the same paragraph of subsection 2 as the current injury, "the employer is liable for the combined disability that is caused by the injuries,..." The court notes that the record was not clear that the agency ever considered this argument. The court concludes, however, that "even if the agency were to have analyzed these facts under the successive-disability statute, the outcome would not change as the statute is not applicable to Hansen's February 15, 2005 injury."
In explaining this reasoning, the court cites section 20 of HF 2581, the legislative intent section for 85.34(7). The court notes that the legislative intent section indicates that "the method of determining the degree of unscheduled permanent partial disability" is unchanged by the statute. The court concludes that the agency cannot determine the degree of unscheduled disability under 85.34(7)(b), and concludes that that section does not apply to unscheduled injuries. The court gives no real guidance on how 85.34(7)(b) is to be interpreted on this issue (although one could argue that the full responsibility rule could apply if the section of the statute does not apply). The legislative history of the statute appears to be given more sway than the actual language of the statute, which clearly applies to unscheduled injuries. The section of the legislative history would appear to indicate simply that the determination of industrial disability, i.e., the application of the McSpadden factors, is not changed by 85.34(7)(b), not that is doesn't apply to unscheduled injuries.
The court goes on to find the 15% industrial disability finding is supported by substantial evidence. It also concludes that the deputy sufficiently explained his reasons for reducing the amount of the IME costs that were payable by the defendants. The court finds there was sufficient reasoning to demonstrate the agency did not abuse its discretion. The court indicated that even if the IME were payable under the costs section, only reasonable costs were to be paid, and the agency elucidated why the costs were not reasonable. On the temporary benefits issue, the court agreed with the district court that the decision of the agency was not sufficient to demonstrate how temporary benefits had been determined, and remanded to the agency.
The holding of Hansen is that 85.34(7)(b)(1) is not applicable to "unscheduled permanent partial disability." This portion of the decision does not appear to flow from either the language of the statute or legislative intent language, and is likely to be the subject of further review by the Supreme Court. In the meantime, it casts a shadow on the application of 85.34(7)(b) in other cases.
Hansen also addresses issues concerning costs, extent of impairment, healing period and temporary partial benefits.
Claimant sustained two injuries at work, a left shoulder injury in 2005 and an injury to her right hand and arm in 2007 which was traumatic. The shoulder injury was cumulative, although there was medical evidence that there was a later acute injury to the shoulder superimposed on the cumulative process. The commissioner concluded that claimant was entitled to 15% industrial disability, did not specifically accept or reject claimant's computation of healing period/TPD benefits, and reduced the costs payable for the IME from $9,502.50 to $2,890. At the district court level, the healing period issue and IME costs issues were remanded to the agency. At the district court, claimant argued that the successive disability statute was unconstitutional and the district court deferred ruling on this issue.
Claimant argued to the court of appeals that the agency had failed to apply the successive disability statute and material principles of industrial disability. Claimant argued that an earlier right shoulder restriction should have been combined with the left shoulder restrictions in determining industrial disability. The statute notes that if a preexisting disability was compensable under the same paragraph of subsection 2 as the current injury, "the employer is liable for the combined disability that is caused by the injuries,..." The court notes that the record was not clear that the agency ever considered this argument. The court concludes, however, that "even if the agency were to have analyzed these facts under the successive-disability statute, the outcome would not change as the statute is not applicable to Hansen's February 15, 2005 injury."
In explaining this reasoning, the court cites section 20 of HF 2581, the legislative intent section for 85.34(7). The court notes that the legislative intent section indicates that "the method of determining the degree of unscheduled permanent partial disability" is unchanged by the statute. The court concludes that the agency cannot determine the degree of unscheduled disability under 85.34(7)(b), and concludes that that section does not apply to unscheduled injuries. The court gives no real guidance on how 85.34(7)(b) is to be interpreted on this issue (although one could argue that the full responsibility rule could apply if the section of the statute does not apply). The legislative history of the statute appears to be given more sway than the actual language of the statute, which clearly applies to unscheduled injuries. The section of the legislative history would appear to indicate simply that the determination of industrial disability, i.e., the application of the McSpadden factors, is not changed by 85.34(7)(b), not that is doesn't apply to unscheduled injuries.
The court goes on to find the 15% industrial disability finding is supported by substantial evidence. It also concludes that the deputy sufficiently explained his reasons for reducing the amount of the IME costs that were payable by the defendants. The court finds there was sufficient reasoning to demonstrate the agency did not abuse its discretion. The court indicated that even if the IME were payable under the costs section, only reasonable costs were to be paid, and the agency elucidated why the costs were not reasonable. On the temporary benefits issue, the court agreed with the district court that the decision of the agency was not sufficient to demonstrate how temporary benefits had been determined, and remanded to the agency.
The holding of Hansen is that 85.34(7)(b)(1) is not applicable to "unscheduled permanent partial disability." This portion of the decision does not appear to flow from either the language of the statute or legislative intent language, and is likely to be the subject of further review by the Supreme Court. In the meantime, it casts a shadow on the application of 85.34(7)(b) in other cases.
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