Supreme Court Reverses Ellingson - Finds that Multiple Healing Periods are Permissible

In Waldinger Corp. v. Mettler, 817 NW2d 1 (Iowa 2012), the Supreme Court finds that multiple healing periods are consistent with section 85.34(1) of the statute, and overrules its earlier decision in Ellingson v. Fleetguard, 599 N.W.2d 440 (Iowa 1999).  Mettler involved a relatively straightforward situation where claimant was found to have reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) by his doctors, was paid permanency benefits, and was later found to be in need of additional surgery for his ankle problems. That surgery was performed, and a few years later a third surgery was performed, following which claimant was off work from September 18, 2007 until December 7, 2007.  In addition to awarding permanency benefits, the commissioner found that claimant was entitled to healing period benefits following the third surgery.  Ultimately, the Court of Appeals concluded that the commissioner had no special expertise in interpreting the statute and held, based on Ellingson, that multiple healing periods were not authorized by section 85.34(1).  The Supreme Court took further review of the healing period issue.

In reviewing the case, the court concluded that although the legislature granted the commissioner the authority to adopt and enforce rules to implement the statute, the court found that this was not a "clear vesting of interpretive authority" and thus concluded that the commissioner's interpretation was not entitled to deference.

The Supreme Court noted the reliance on the language in Ellingson, which had concluded that once significant improvement from an injury is not anticipated, all temporary disability benefits are finally terminated.  The Supreme Court stated the following with regard to Ellingson:

 "We now conclude our interpretation in Ellingson of section 85.34(1) as a categorical prohibition of an award of healing period benefits for disability from work occurring after the date MMI has been achieved was erroneous, and we therefore overrule it."

The court rejected the argument that because section 85.34(1) talks in terms of "a healing period" that this means that there is only a single healing period.  The court concludes that the article "a" was not intended to limit healing periods to a single healing period, but was rather meant to convey the meaning "any" and not "one."  The court finds that Ellingson was flawed because it diminished the promise of continuing medical care under section 85.27 by eliminating subsequent healing periods, and ignored the fact that a single disability could cause a new period of temporary disability even after a claimant had achieved MMI.

The court noted that the employer's obligation for providing medical treatment was not limited to the duration of the healing period.  The court stated: "We see no principled reason why Mettler, or any similarly situated claimant, should be disqualified from a healing period remedy when ordinary and necessary medical care for a work-related injury temporarily removes them again from the work force."  The court also noted that their interpretation avoided the "absurd and unjust result" that occurred if the statute allowed only a single healing period.  Thus, even in situations where there has been an unsuccessful return to work, multiple healing periods are allowed under the Mettler decision.  The court notes that section 85.34(1) leaves room for the possibility that continuing medical treatment "can result in a series of intermittent invasive treatments, periods of temporary disability from work and convalescence, serial MMI dates, and revised permanent disability ratings following a single work-related injury.  In other words, the court acknowledges that each case can follow a different path, and that limiting a claimant to a single healing period is inconsistent with the statute.

The court also states that this view is consistent with the liberal construction accorded the workers' compensation statute for the benefit of the working person.

The court also concludes that the Court of Appeals' conclusion that healing period benefits could not be provided because there was no evidence to support a finding that the doctors anticipated improvement from the 2007 surgery need not be addressed, since the question was as to the new period of disability following the surgery.  The court did note in a footnote that it was likely that the doctor would not have performed surgery if he had not concluded that this would improve the claimant's condition. 

Justice Waterman concurred specially, concluding that he would have deferred to the commissioner's judgment as to the interpretation of the term healing period.  He  believed that deference was owed to the agency because of its special expertise in terms of interpreting terms of art within the statute.  Justice Waterman also noted that "my adherence to stare decisis precludes me from joining the full opinion."

The Mettler decision confirms what had been the practice before the agency of allowing intermittent healing periods, and allows for a more logical interpretation of the statute that provides benefits when a claimant is unable to work because of an injury.  It overrules Ellingson, which had long been an impediment to obtaining healing period benefits after a claimant had reached MMI, and which seemed to be decided based on the peculiar facts of that case.  In practice, the decision in Mettler should not make that much of a difference in agency decisions, but it prevents a retrogression of the agency into decisions that allowed for only a single healing period.  

The Iowa Workers' Compensation Core Group of the Iowa Association for Justice filed an amicus brief in Mettler urging the result reached by the court.