Supreme Court Decision Apportioning Risk in Case Involving Volunteer Firefighter

In Andover Volunteer Fire Department & Travelers Ins. Co. v. Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co., 2010 WL 3186153 (Iowa, No. 08-1628 Aug. 13, 2010), the Supreme Court allocated risk between two insurance companies.  The claimant in the underlying case, Justin Faur, was an employee of Johnson Valley Beef as well as a volunteer firefighter for the Andover VFD.  On the date of the injury, Justin was attempting to rescue a co-employee who had been overcome by methane fumes at Johnson Valley Beef.  At about the same time as Justin was attempting to rescue the co-worker, he was paged by the VFD to the scene of the accident.  Both the co-worker and Justin died as a result of the accident.

Grinnell Mutual, which was the insurance carrier for Johnson Valley Beef, paid the claim and sought contribution or indemnity from Travelers, the carrier for the Andover VFD.  Grinnell claimed that Justin had been "summoned to duty as a volunteer firefighter" under 85.61(7)(a) of the Code.  The hearing deputy concluded that Justin had been summoned prior to his death, and found that Travelers was one-half responsible for the workers' compensation benefits payable.  The commissioner did not believe the timing of the summons was critical, as Justin had been summoned by the circumstances themselves, which compelled him to act in an emergency situation.  The district court rejected the commissioner's approach, and remanded for further proceedings as to when Justin had been summoned.

As the court has done in a number of recent cases, they being their discussion by noting that since the commissioner had not been clearly vested by the legislature with the authority to interpret the legislative language, in this case the phrase "summoned to duty."  Accordingly, no deference was shown the commissioner in his interpretation of that language.

The court indicates that its role is "only to determine the intent of the legislature."  Although courts resolve uncertainties in language, it is only done in "a way that captures the will of the legislature."  The ambiguity in this case was the phrase "summoned to duty."  The court noted that 85.61(7)(a) provided a special "course of employment" rule for volunteer firefighters.  That section places the volunteer firefighter in the course of employment at any time from when the firefighter is summoned to duty until the time she or he is discharged from duty by the chief or the chief's designee.

The court noted that the usual going and coming rule was not applicable to volunteer firefighters.  The court indicates that the phrase "summoned to duty"  indicates that the firefighter is summoned as a member of a group and that the statute also requires that the summons is issued at the request of a person in command of the group of volunteer firefighters.  The court found nothing in the context of the statute to reveal an intent "for volunteer firefighters to summon themselves to duty."  After considering common meanings of the terms used, the court concludes that the volunteer firefighter must be called to duty by a third party.  Any other approach, according to the court, would be contrary to the legislative intent.

The next question is whether the summons must be heard or received by the volunteer firefighter.  The court concludes that the language of the statute focused on whether the particular injured volunteer firefighter was summoned, not on whether the summons was sent.  The court stated that absurd results could occur if the language were not interpreted to require the receipt of a summons.  The court concluded that the summons must be received by the injured firefighter.  The court affirmed the decision of the district court and remanded to the agency for further proceedings.

Justices Hecht, Wiggins and Baker concurred specially, premised on a disagreement over whether the firefighter must prove that he or she received the department's call to duty.  According to the minority, this interpretation resulted in an embellishment of the words chosen by the legislature.  The minority did not see anything illogical, impractical or absurd about commencing the period of "in the course of" employment when an authorized person sounded the call to action.  The minority also notes that the majority ignores the principle that the workers' compensation statute is to be applied broadly and liberally.

The minority view correctly notes that the purpose of 85.61(7)(a) was to extend the protections of the statute to volunteer firefighters over and above the normal "course of employment" rules.  Although the majority concedes that the section negates the normal "going and coming" rules for volunteer firefighters, it fails to take the next logical step and interpret the section liberally so as not to require proof that the the call to duty was actually received.

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